From: [k--ar--s] at [cc.memphis.edu] Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns Subject: RKBA Quotes 2/4 Date: 16 Aug 95 02:30:25 -0500 "To judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to conclude, that the fiery and destructive passions of war, reign in the human breast, with much more powerful sway, than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and, that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting tranquility, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character." --Alexander Hamilton (1757-1804), writing as "Publius," in _Federalist No. 34,_January 5, 1788 "FEDERALIST No. 29 Concerning the Militia To the People of the State of New York: The power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the internal peace of the confederacy. It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public defense. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual intelligence and concert an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority. It is, therefore, with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the convention proposes to empower the Union 'to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, _reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.'_ Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan of the convention, there is none that was so little to have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this particular provision has been attacked. If a well- regulated militia be the most natural defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is committed, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence than a thousand prohibitions upon paper. In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty, whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that a right to pass all laws _necessary_ and _proper_ to execute its declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evident that the supposition of a want of power to require the aid of the POSSE COMITATUS is entirely destitute of color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the federal government over the militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall we think of the motives which could induce men of sense to reason in this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and judgment? By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of the federal government. It is observed that select corps may be formed, composed of the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select corps as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the federal legislature from this State on the subject of a militia establishment, I should hold to him, in substance, the following discourse: "The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is not a day, or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character of a well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduction from the productive labor of the country, to an amount which, calculating upon the present numbers of the people, would not fall far short of the whole expense of the civil establishments of all the States. To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an extent, would be unwise: and the experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course of a year. "But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia. The attention of the government ought particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps of moderate extent, upon such principles as will really fit them for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained militia, ready to take the field whenever the defense of the State shall require it. This will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens little if at all inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for a standing army, and the best possible security against it, if it should exist." Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety from the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on the point, is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee. There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow- citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command its services when necessary, while the particular States are to have the _sole and exclusive appointment of the officers?_ If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia. In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance, which instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes --Gorgons Hydras and Chimeras dire-- discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming everything it touches into a monster. A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable suggestions which have taken place respecting the power of calling for the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch are to be paid in militiamen instead of louis d'ors and ducats. At one moment there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the liberties of the people; at another moment the militia of Virginia are to be dragged from their homes five or six hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance to subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. Do the persons who rave at this rate imagine that their art or their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities upon the people of America for infallible truths? If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism, what need of the militia? If there should be no army, whither would the militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant and hopeless expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them in their imagined intrenchments of power, and to make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed people? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting the detestation of the very instruments of their intended usurpations? Do they usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts of power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this sort the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning people? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts? If we were even to suppose the national rulers actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they would employ such preposterous means to accomplish their designs. In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper that the militia of a neighboring State should be marched into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence of faction or sedition. This was frequently the case, in respect to the first object, in the course of the late war; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal end of our political association. If the power of affording it be placed under the direction of the Union, there will be no danger of a supine and listless inattention to the dangers of a neighbor, till its near approach had superadded the incitements of self preservation to the too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy." --Alexander Hamilton, writing as "Publius," in the_Daily Advertiser,_ January 9, 1788 "Sixth Rule. [quoting Nedham] 'That the people be continually trained up in the exercise of arms, and the militia lodged only in the people's hands, or that part of them which are most firm to the interest of liberty, and so the power may rest fully in the disposition of their supreme assemblies.'--The limitation to 'that part most firm to the interest of liberty,' was inserted here, no doubt, to reserve the right of disarming all the friends of Charles Stuart, the nobles and the bishops. Without stopping to enquire into the justice, policy, or necessity of this, the rule in general is excellent: all the consequences that our author draws from it, however, cannot be admitted. One consequence was, according to him, 'that nothing could at any time be imposed upon the people but by their consent,' that is, by the consent of themselves, 'or of such as were by them intrusted. As Aristotle tells us, in his fourth book of Politics, the Greek states ever had special care to place the use and exercise of arms in the people, because the commonwealth is theirs who hold the arms: the sword and sovereignty ever walk hand in hand together.' This is perfectly just. 'Rome, and the territories about it, were trained up perpetually in arms, and the whole commonwealth, by this means, became one formal militia. There was no difference in order between the citizen, the husbandman, and the soldier.' This was the 'usual course, even before they had gained their tribunes and assemblies; that is, in the infancy of the senate, immediately after the expulsion of their kings.' But why does our author disguise that it was the same under the [Roman] kings? This is the truth; and it is not honest to conceal it here. In the times of Tarquin, even, we find no standing army, 'not any form of soldiery;' -- 'nor do we find, that in after times they permitted a deposition of the arms of the commonwealth in any other way, till their empire increasing, necessity constrained them to erect a continued stipendiary soldiery abroad, in foreign parts, either for the holding or winning of provinces.' Thus we have the truth from [Nedham] himself; the whole people were a militia under the kings, under the senate, and after the senate's authority was tempered by popular tribunes and assemblies; but after the people acquired power, equal at least, if not superior to the senate, then 'forces were kept up, the ambition of Cinna, the horrid tyranny of Sylla, and the insolence of Marius, and the self[ish] ends of divers[e] other leaders, both before and after them, filled all Italy with tragedies, and the world with wonder.' Is this not an argument for the power of kings and senates, rather than the uncontroulable power of the people, when it is confessed that the two first used it wisely, and the last perniciously? The truth is, as he said before, 'the sword and sovereignty go together.' While the sovereignty was in the senate under the kings, the militia obeyed the orders of the senate given out by the kings; while the sovereignty was in the senate, under the consuls, the militia obeyed the orders of the senate given out by consuls; but when the sovereignty was lost by the senate, and gained by the people, the militia was neglected, a standing army set up, and obeyed the orders of the popular idols. 'The people, seeing what misery they had brought upon themselves, by keeping their armies within the bowels of Italy, passed a law to prevent it, and to employ them abroad, or at a convenient distance: the law was, that if any general marched over the river Rubicon, he should be declared a public enemy;' and in the passage of that river this following inscription 'was erected, to put the men of arms in mind of their duty: Imperator, sive miles, sive tyrannus armatus quisque, sistito vexillum, armaque deponito, nec citra hunc amnem trajicito; general, or soldier, or tyrant in arms, whosoever thou be, stand, quit thy standard, and lay aside thy arms, or else cross not this river.' But to what purpose was the law? Caesar knew the people now to be sovereign, without controul of the senate, and that he had the confidence both of them and his army, and_cast the die,_ and erected 'praetorian bands, instead of a public militia; and was followed in it by his successors, by the Grand Signior, by Cosmus the first great duke of Tuscany, by the Muscovite, the Russian, the Tartar, by the French,' and, he might have added, by all Europe, who by that means are all absolute [monarchs], excepting England, because the late king Charles I, who attempted it, did not succeed; and because our author's 'Right Constitution of a Commonwealth' did not succeed: if it had, Oliver Cromwell and his descendants would have been emperors of Old England as the Caesars were of Old Rome. The militia and sovereignty are inseparable. In the English constitution, if the whole nation were a militia, there would be a militia to defend the crown, the lords, or the commons, if either were attacked: the crown, though it commands them, has no power to use them improperly, because it cannot pay or subsist them without the consent of the lords and commons; but if the militia are to obey a sovereignty in a single assembly, it is commanded, paid, subsisted, and a standing army too may be raised, paid, and subsisted, by the vote of a majority; the militia then must all obey the sovereign majority, or divide, and part follow the majority, and part the minority. This last case is civil war; but until it comes to this, the whole militia may be employed by the majority in any degree of tyranny and oppression over the minority. The constitution [of Britain] furnishes no resource or remedy; nothing affords a chance of relief but rebellion and civil war: if this terminates in favour of the minority, they will tyrannize in their turns, exasperated by revenge, in addition to ambition and avarice; if the majority prevail, their domination becomes more cruel, and soon ends in one despot. It must be made a sacred maxim, that the militia obey the executive power, which represents the whole people in the execution of the laws. To suppose arms in the hands of citizens, to be used at individual discretion, except in private self-defence, or by partial orders of towns, counties, or districts of a state, is to demolish every constitution, and lay the laws prostrate, so that liberty can be enjoyed by no man --it is a dissolution of the government. The fundamental law of the militia is, that it be created, directed, and commanded by the laws, and ever for the support of the laws. This truth is acknowledged by our author, when he says, 'The arms of the commonwealth should be lodged in the hands of that part of the people which are firm to its establishment.'" --John Adams (1735-1826),_A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America,_ p.471-475 (London, 1788) <> "But, sir, the people themselves have it in their power effectually to resist usurpation, without being driven to an appeal of arms. An act of usurpation is not obligatory; it is not law; and any man may be justified in his resistance. Let him be considered as a criminal by the general government, yet only his fellow-citizens can convict him; they are his jury, and if they pronounce him innocent, not all the powers of Congress can hurt him; and innocent they certainly will pronounce him, if the supposed law he resisted was an act of usurpation." --Theophilus Parsons (1750-1813), in the Massachusetts Convention on the ratification of the Constitution, January 23, 1788, in_Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,_ Jonathan Elliot, ed., v.2 p.94 (Philadelphia, 1836) <> "Is it possible... that an army could be raised for the purpose of enslaving themselves and their brethren? or, if raised, whether they could subdue a Nation of freemen, who know how to prize liberty, and who have arms in their hands?" --Rep. Theodore Sedgwick (1746-1813), in the Massachusetts Convention on the ratification of the Constitution, January 24, 1788, in_Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,_ Jonathan Elliot, ed., v.2 p.97 (Philadelphia, 1836) "A Militia, when properly formed, are in fact the people themselves, and render regular troops in a great measure unnecessary. The powers to form and arm the militia, to appoint their officers, and to command their services, are very important: nor ought they in a confederated republic to be lodged, solely, in any one member of the government. First, the constitution ought to secure a genuine [militia] and guard against a select militia, by providing that the militia shall always be kept well organized, armed, and disciplined, and include, according to the past and general usage of the states, all men capable of bearing arms; and that all regulations tending to render this general militia useless and defenceless, by establishing select corps of militia, or distinct bodies of military men, not having permenent interests and attachments in the community [ought] to be avoided. I am persuaded, I need not multiply words to convince you of the value and solidity of this principle, as it respects general liberty, and the duration of a free and mild government: having this principle well fixed by the constitution, then the federal head may prescribe a general uniform plan, on which the respective states shall form and train the militia, appoint their officers and solely manage them, except when called into service of the union, and when called into that service, they may be commanded and governed by the union. This arrangement combines energy and safety in it; it places the sword in the hands of the solid interest of the community, and not in the hands of men destitute of property, of principle, or [destitute] of an attachment to the society and government, [like such men as those] who often form the select corps of peace or ordinary [military] establishments: by it, the militia are the people, immediately under the management of the state governments, but on a uniform federal plan, and called into the service, command, and government of the union, when necessary for the common defense and general tranquility. But, say gentlemen, the general militia are the for the most part employed at home in their private concerns, cannot well be called out, or be depended upon; that we must have a select militia; that is, as I understand it, particular corps or bodies of young men, and of men who have but little to do at home, particularly armed and disciplined in some measure, at the public expence, and always ready to take to the field. These corps, not much unlike regular troops, will ever produce an inattention to the general militia; and the consequence has ever been, and always must be, that the substantial men, having families and property, will be generally without arms, without knowing the use of them, and defenseless; whereas, to preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole body of the people always possess arms, and be taught alike, especially when young, how to use them; nor does it follow from this, that all promiscuously must go into actual service on every occasion. The mind that aims at a select militia, must be influenced by a truly anti-republican principle; and when we see many men disposed to practice upon it, whenever they can prevail, no wonder true republicans are for carefully guarding against it. As a farther check, it may be proper to add, that the militia of any state shall not remain in the service of the union, beyond a given period, without the consent of the state legislature." --U.S. Senator Richard Henry Lee (1732-1794) of Virginia, _A number of Additional Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican; leading to a fair examination of the System of Government proposed by the late Convention; to several essential and necessary alterations in it. and calculated to Illustrate and Support the Principles and Positions Laid down in the preceding Letters,_ (New York, January 25, 1788), p.169 <> "FEDERALIST No. 46 The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared To the People of the State of New York: Resuming the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the Federal Government or the State Governments will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people. Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them, as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States. I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving the proofs for another place. The Federal and State Governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrouled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone; and that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth, no less than decency, requires that the event in every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their common constituents. Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective States. Into the administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic, and personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments; on the side of these therefore the popular bias, may well be expected most strongly to incline. Experience speaks the same language in this case. The federal administration, though hitherto very defective in comparison with what may be hoped under a better system, had, during the war, and particularly whilst the independent fund of paper emissions was in credit, an activity and importance as great as it can well have in any future circumstances whatever. It was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their object the protection of everything that was dear, and the acquisition of everything that could be desirable to the people at large. It was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment of the people were turned anew to their own particular governments; that the Federal Council was at no time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed enlargements of its powers and importance, was the side usually taken by the men who wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow citizens. If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can only result, from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due: But even in that case the State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered. The remaining points on which I propose to compare the federal and State governments, are the disposition and the faculty they may respectively possess, to resist and frustrate the measures of each other. It has been already proved, that the members of the federal [government] will be more dependent on the members of the State governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of the people, on whom both will depend, will be more on the side of the State governments, than of the Federal Government. So far as the disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these causes, the State governments must clearly have the advantage. But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the Federal Government, will generally be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that the members of the State governments will carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the general government. A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the Legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State Legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the objects of their affections and consultations? For the same reason that the members of the State Legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal legislature will be likely to attach themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the latter what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper sacrifices have been made of local considerations, to the aggrandizement of the Federal Government, the great interests of the nation have suffered on a hundred, from an undue attention to the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate, that the new Federal Government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy than the existing government may have pursued; much less, that its views will be as confined as those of the State legislatures; but only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual States, or the preorgatives of their governments. The motives on the part of the State governments, to augment their prerogatives by defalcations from the Federal Government, will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members. Were it admitted, however, that the Federal Government may feel an equal disposition with the State governments to extend its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the national government, be generally popular in that State and should not too grossly violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on the State alone. The opposition of the federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would but inflame the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty. On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the Federal Government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to encounter. But ambitious encroachments of the Federal Government, on the authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every Government would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign yoke; and unless the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the Federal Government to such an extremity. In the contest with Great Britain, one part of the empire was employed against the other. The more numerous part invaded the rights of the less numerous part. The attempt was unjust and unwise; but it was not in speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would be the contest in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few representatives of the people would be opposed to the people themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter. The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may previously accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained in these papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger. That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of time, elect an uninterupted succession of men ready to betray both; that the traitors should, throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishment; that the governments and the people of the States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism. Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the Federal Government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid alone they would not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect the national will and direct the national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment, by a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it. The argument under the present head may be put into a very concise form, which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which the Federal Government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On the other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State governments, who will be supported by the people. On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged in the Federal Government are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union; and that all those alarms which have been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State Governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them." --James Madison (1751-1836), writing as "Publius," in the _New York Packet,_ January 29, 1788 "The militia of these free commonwealths, entitled and accustomed to their arms, when compared with any possible army, must be _tremendous and irresistable_. Who are the militia? _[A]re they not ourselves[?]_ Is it feared, then, that we shall turn our arms _each man against his own bosom[?]_ Congress have no power to disarm the militia. Their swords, and every other terrible implement of the soldier, are _the birth-right of an American_... [T]he unlimited power of the sword is not in the hands of either the_federal or state governments,_ but, where I trust in God it will ever remain, _in the hands of the people._" --Tench Coxe (1755-1824), writing as "A Pennsylvanian," in _Pennsylvania Gazette,_ February 20, 1788 [see_A Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution_(Kamiski and Saladino, eds., 1981) p.1778-1780] "I have received with great pleasure your friendly letter of Apr. 24. It has come to hand after I had written my letters for the present conve[y]ance, and just in time to add this to them. I learn with great pleasure the progress of the new Constitution. Indeed I have presumed it would gain on the public mind, as I confess it has on my own. At first, tho[ugh] I saw the great mass and groundwork was good, I disliked many [of its] appendages. Reflection and discussion have cleared me of most of these [apprehensions]. You have satisfied me as to the query which I had put to you about the right of direct taxation. (My first wish was that nine states would adopt it in order to ensure what is good in it, and that the others might, by holding off, produce the necessary amendments. But the plan of Massachuset[t]s is far preferable, and will I hope be followed by those who are yet to decide. There are only two amendments which I am anxious for. 1. A bill of rights, which it is so much the interest of all to have, that I concieve it must be yielded [given]. The 1st. amendment proposed by Massachuset[t]s will in some degree answer this end, but not so well. It will do too much in some instances and too litle in others. It will cripple the federal government in some cases where it ought to be free, and not restrain it where restraint would be right. The 2d. amendment which appears to me essential is restoring the principle of necessary rotation, particularly to the Senate and Presidency: but most of all to the last. Re-eligibility makes him an officer for life, and the disasters inseperable from an elective monarchy, render it preferable, if we cannot tread back that step, that we should go forward and take refuge in an hereditary one. Of the correction of this article however I entertain no present hope, because I find it scarcely excited an objection in America. And if it does not take place ere long, it assuredly never will. The natural progress of things is for liberty to y[ie]ld and government to gain ground. As yet our spirits are free. Our jealousy is only put to sleep by the unlimited confidence we all repose in the person [Washington] to whom we all look as our president. After him inferior characters may perhaps succeed and awaken us to the danger which his merit has led us into. For the present however, the general adoption [of the Constitution] is to be prayed for, and I wait with great anxiety for the news from Maryland and S. Carolina which have decided before this, and wish that Virginia, now in session, may give the 9th vote of approbation. There could them be no doubt of N. Carolina, N. York, and New Hampshire.) But what do you propose to do with Rhode Island? As long as there is hope, we should give her time. I cannot conceive but that she will come to rights in the long run. Force, in whatever form, would be a dangerous precedent. There are rumours that the Austrian army is obliged to retire a little; that the Spanish squadron is gone to South America; that the English have excited a rebellion there, and some others equally unauthenticated. The bankruptcies in London have recommended with new force. There is no saying where this fire will end. Perhaps in the general conflagration of all their paper [money]. If not now, it must ere long. With only 20 million of coin, and three or four hundred million of circulating paper, public and private, nothing is necessary but a general panic, produced either by [bank] failures, invasion, or any other cause, and the whole visionary [illusory] fabric vanishes into air and sh[o]ws that paper is poverty, that it is only the ghost of money, and not money itself. 100 years ago they [the British] had 20 odd millions of coin. Since that they have brought in from Holland by borrowing 40. millions more. Yet they have but 20 millions left, and they talk of being rich and of having the balance of trade in their favour. --[John] Paul Jones is invited into the Empress[ of France]'s service with the rank of rear admiral, and to have a seperate command. I wish it corresponded with the views of Congress to give him that rank for the taking of the _Seraphis._ [I look to] this officer as our great future depend[e]nce on the sea, where alone we should think of ever having a force. He is young enough to see the day when we shall be more populous than the whole British dominions and able to fight them ship to ship. We should procure him then every possible opportunity of acquiring experience. I have the honour to be with sentiments of the most perfect esteem[,] Dear sir[,] Your friend and servant." --Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), letter to Edward Carrington, (from Paris, May 27, 1788) "Guard with jealous attention the public liberty. Suspect every one who approaches that jewel. Unfortunately, nothing will preserve it but downright force. Whenever you give up that force, you are inevitably ruined." --Patrick Henry (1736-1799), in the Virginia Convention on the ratification of the Constitution, June 5, 1788, in_Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,_ Jonathan Elliot, ed., v.3 p.45 (Philadelphia, 1836) "I believe there are more instances of the abridgment of the freedom of the people by the gradual and silent encroachments of those in power, than by violent and sudden usurpations." -- James Madison (1751-1836), June 6, 1788, in the Virginia Convention on the ratification of the Constitution, in_Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,_ Jonathan Elliot, ed., v.3 p.87 (Philadelphia, 1836) <> "Are we at last brought to such a humiliating and debasing degradation, that we cannot be trusted with arms for our own defence? Where is the difference between having our arms in our own possession and under our own direction, and having them under the management of Congress? If our defence be the_real_object of having those arms, in whose hands can they be trusted with more propriety, or equal safety to us, as in our own hands?" --Patrick Henry (1736-1799), June 9, 1788, in the Virginia Convention on the ratification of the Constitution, in_Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,_ Jonathan Elliot, ed., v.3 p.168 (Philadelphia, 1836) "To disarm the people... was the best and most effectual way to enslave them." --George Mason (1725-1792), June 14, 1788, in the Virginia Convention on the ratification of the Constitution, in_Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,_ Jonathan Elliot, ed., v.3 p.380 (Philadelphia, 1836) <> "The great object is, that every man be armed. [...] Every one who is able may have a gun." --Patrick Henry (1736-1799), in the Virginia Convention on the ratification of the Constitution, June 14, 1788, in_Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,_ Jonathan Elliot, ed., v.3 p.386 (Philadelphia, 1836) "I ask, Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except for a few public officers." --George Mason (1725-1792), in the Virginia Convention on the ratification of the Constitution, June 16, 1788, in_Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,_ Jonathan Elliot, ed., v.3 p.425 (Philadelphia, 1836) <> "Whenever, therefore, the profession of arms becomes a distinct order in the state... the end of the social compact is defeated... No free government was ever founded, or ever preserved its liberty without uniting the characters of the citizen and soldier in those destined for the defense of the state... Such are a well regulated militia, composed of the freeholders, citizen and husbandman, who take up arms to preserve their property, as individuals, and their rights as freemen."--"M.T. Cicero," in Charleston_State Gazette,_ September 8, 1788 "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person." --James Madison (1751-1836), I Annals of Congress 434, June 8, 1789 <> "Last Monday a string of amendments were presented to the lower House; these altogether respect personal liberty..." --Senator William Grayson (1740-1790) of Virginia in a letter to Patrick Henry, June 12, 1789 [in Patrick Henry's_Papers_ vol.3, p.391 (1951)] "As civil rulers, not having their duty to the people duly before them, may attempt to tyrannize, and as the military forces which must be occasionally raised to defend our country, might pervert their power to the injury of their fellow-citizens, the people are confirmed by the next article in their right to keep and bear their private arms." --Tench Coxe (1755-1824), writing as "A Pennsylvanian," in "Remarks On The First Part Of The Amendments To The Federal Constitution," in the _Philadelphia Federal Gazette,_ June 18, 1789, p.2 col.1 <> "The people are not to be disarmed of their weapons. They are left in full possession of them." --Zachariah Johnson (????-????), in the Virginia Convention on the ratification of the Constitution, June 25, 1788, in_Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,_ Jonathan Elliot, ed., v.3 p.646 (Philadelphia, 1836) "This declaration of rights, I take it, is intended to secure the people against the mal-administration of the government; if we could suppose that, in all cases, the rights of the people would be attended to, the occasion for guards of this kind would be removed. Now, I am apprehensive, sir, that this clause would give an opportunity to the people in power to destroy the constitution itself. They can declare who are those religiously scrupulous, and prevent them from bearing arms. What, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the bane of liberty. Now, it must be evident, that under this provision, together with their other powers, Congress could take such measures with respect to a militia, as make a standing army necessary. Whenever Government[s] mean to invade the rights and liberties of the people, they always attempt to destroy the militia, in order to raise an army upon their ruins. This was actually done by Great Britain at the commencement of the late revolution. They used every means in their power to prevent the establishment of an effective militia to the eastward. The Assembly of Massachusetts, seeing the rapid progress that [the British] administration were making to divest them of their inherent privileges, endeavored to counteract them by the organization of the militia; but they were always defeated by the influence of the Crown." --Rep. Elbridge Gerry (1744-1814) (Mass.), Annals of Congress, vol.I, p.750, August 17, 1789 [in _The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History,_ Schwartz, ed.] <> "We are told there is no cause to fear. When we consider the great powers of Congress, there is great cause of alarm. They can disarm the militia. If they were armed, they would be a resource against great oppressions. The laws of a great empire are difficult to be executed. If the laws of the union were oppressive, they could not carry them into effect, if the people were possessed of the proper means of defence." --William Lenoir (????-????), in the North Carolina Convention on the ratification of the Constitution, in_Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,_ Jonathan Elliot, ed., v.4 p.203 (Philadelphia, 1836) <> "That the said Constitution shall never be construed to authorize Congress to infringe the just liberty of the press or the rights of conscience; or to prevent the people of the United states who are peaceable citizens from keeping their own arms..." --Samuel Adams (1722-1803), in_Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,_ pp.86-87, (Pierce & Hale, Boston, 1850), also in Philadelphia_Independent Gazetteer,_ August 20, 1789 "The right of the people to keep and bear arms has been recognized by the General Government; but the best security of that right after all is, the military spirit, that taste for martial exercises, which has always distinguished the free citizens of these States... Such men form the best barrier to the liberties of America." --Gazette of the United States, October 14, 1789, p.211, col.2 "I embrace with great satisfaction the opportunity which now presents itself of congratulating you on the present favorable prospects of our public affairs. The recent accession of the important State of North Carolina to the Constitution of the United States (of which official information has been received), the rising credit and respectability of our country, the general and increasing good will toward the Government of the Union, and the concord, peace, and plenty with which we are blessed are circumstances auspicious in an eminent degree to our national prosperity. In resuming your consultations for the general good you can not but derive encouragement from the reflection that the measures of the last session have been as satisfactory to your constituents as the novelty and difficulty of the work allowed you to hope. Still further to realize their expectations and to secure the blessings which a gracious Providence has placed within our reach will in the course of the present important session call for the cool and deliberate exertion of your patriotism, firmness and wisdom. Among the many interesting objects which will engage your attention that of providing for the common defense will merit particular regard. To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace. A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined; to which end a uniform and well- digested plan is requisite; and their safety and interest require that they should promote such manufactures as tend to render them independent of others for essential, particularly military, supplies. The proper establishment of the troops which may be deemed indispensable will be entitled to mature consideration. In the arrangements which may be made respecting it it will be of importance to consider the comfortable support of the officers and soldiers with a due regard to economy. There was reason to hope that the pacific measures adopted with regard to certain hostile tribes of Indians would have relieved the inhabitants of our Southern and Western frontiers from their depredations, but you will perceive from the information contained in the papers which I shall direct to be laid before you (comprehending a communication from the Commonwealth of Virginia) that we ought to be prepared to afford protection to those parts of the Union, and, if necessary, to punish aggressors. The interests of the United States require that our intercourse withother nations should be facilitated by such provisions as will enable me to fulfill my duty in that respect in the manner which circumstances may render most conducive to the public good, and to this end that the compensations to be made to the persons who may be employed should, according to the nature of their appointments, be defined by law, and a competent fund designated for defraying the expenses incident to the conduct of our foreign affairs. Various considerations also render it expedient that the terms on which foreigners may be admitted to the rights of citizens should be speedily ascertained by a uniform rule of naturalization. Uniformity in the currency, weights, and measures of the United States is an object of great importance, and will, I am persuaded, be duly attended to. The advancement of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures by all proper means will not, I trust, need recommendation; but I can not forbear intimating to you the expediency of giving effectual encouragement as well to the introduction of new and useful inventions from abroad as to the exertions of skill and genius in producing them at home, and of facilitating the intercourse between the distant parts of our country by a due attention to the post- office and post-roads. Nor am I less persuaded that you will agree with me in opinion that there is nothing which can better deserve your patronage than the promotion of science and literature. Knowledge is in every country the surest basis of public happiness. In one in which the measures of government receive their impressions so immediately from the sense of the community as in ours it is proportionably essential. To the security of a free constitution it contributes in various ways --by convincing those who are intrusted with the public administration that every valuable end of government is best answered, by the enlightened confidence of the people, and by teaching the people themselves to know and to value their own rights; to discern and provide against invasions of them; to distinguish between oppression and the necessary exercise of lawful authority; between burthens proceeding from a disregard to their convenience and those resulting from the inevitable exigencies of society; to discriminate the spirit of liberty from that of licentiousness --cherishing the first, avoiding the last-- and uniting a speedy but temperate vigilance against encroachments, with an inviolable respect to the laws. Whether this desirable object will be best promoted by affording aids to seminaries of learning already established, by the institution of a national university, or by any other expedients will be well worthy of a place in the deliberations of the Legislature." --George Washington, First "State of the Union" speech [First Annual Address], January 8, 1790 "Firearms stand next in importance to the Constitution itself. They are the American people's liberty teeth and keystone under independence. The church, the plow, the prarie wagon, and citizen's firearms are indelibly related. From the hour the Pilgrims landed, to the present day, events, occurrences, and tendencies prove that to insure peace, security and happiness, the rifle and the pistol are equally indispensable. Every corner of this land knows firearms, and more than 99 99/100 percent of them by their silence indicate they are in safe and sane hands. The very atmosphere of firearms anywhere and everywhere restrains evil interference; they deserve a place with all that's good. When firearms, go all goes; we need them every hour." --falsely attributed to George Washington, address to the second session of the first U.S. Congress <> "Under every government the dernier [Fr. last, or final] resort of the people, is an appeal to the sword; whether to defend themselves against the open attacks of a foreign enemy, or to check the insidious encroachments of domestic foes. Whenever a people... entrust the defence of their country to a regular, standing army, composed of mercenaries, the power of that country will remain under the direction of the most wealthy citizens... [Y]our liberties will be safe as long as you support a well regulated militia." --"A Framer" in the_Independent Gazetteer,_January 29, 1791, p.2 col.3 <> "Another of these [democratizing] operations is making every citizen a soldier, and every soldier a citizen; not only_permitting_every man to arm, but_obliging_him to arm. This fact, [if] told in Europe, previous to the French Revolution, would have gained little credit; or at least it would have been regarded as a mark of an uncivilized people, extremely dangerous to a well-ordered society. Men who build systems [of government] on an inversion of nature, are obliged to invert every thing that is to make [up] part of that system. It is_because the people are civilized, that they are with safety armed._ It is an effect of their conscious dignity, as citizens enjoying equal rights, that they wish not to invade the rights of others. The danger (where there is any) from armed citizens, is only to the _government,_ not to _society;_ and as long as they have nothing to revenge in the government (which they cannot have while it is in their own hands) there are many advantages in their being accustomed to the use of arms, and no possible disadvantage. * * * One general character will apply to much [of] the greater part of the wars of modern times,--they are _political,_ and not _vindictive._ This alone is sufficient to account for their real origin. They are wars of agreement, rather than of dissention; and the conquest is taxes, and not territory. To carry on this business, it is necessary not only to keep up the military spirit of the noblesse by titles and pensions, and to keep in pay a vast number of troops, who know no other God but their king; who lose all ideas of themselves, in contemplating their officers; and who forget the duties of a man, to practise those of a soldier, --this is but half the operation: an essential part of the military system is to disarm the people, to hold all the functions of war, as well the arm that executes, as the will that declares it, equally above their reach. This part of the system has a double effect, it palsies the hand and brutalizes the mind: a habitual disuse of physical forces totally destroys the moral [force]; and men lose at once the power of protecting themselves, and of discerning the cause of their oppression. It is almost useless to mention the conclusions which every rational mind must draw from these considerations. But though they are too obvious to be mistaken, they are still too important to be passed over in silence; for we seem to be arrived at that epoch in human affairs, when 'all useful ideas, and truths the most necessary to the happiness of mankind, are no longer exclusively destined to adorn the pages of a book.' Nations, wearied out with imposture begin to provide for the safety of man, instead of pursuing his destruction. [Barlow quotes the French National Assembly. It is only with historical perspective that this paragraph now takes on an ironic cast... -KB] I will mention as one conclusion, which bids fair to be a practical one, that the way to prevent wars is not merely to change the military system; for that, like the church, is a necessary part of governments as they now stand, and of society as now organized: but the _principle of government_ must be completely changed; and the consequence of this will be such a total renovation of society, as to banish standing armies, overturn the military system, and exclude the possibility of war. [In this, while not correct in the particulars, Barlow does make a telling point, in that republican governments, so long as they _remain_ democratic, are less warlike than monarchies, and when they go to war, tend to be much more successful, due to popular support. --KB] Only admit the original, unalterable truth,_that all men are equal in their rights,_ and the foundation of every thing is laid; to build the superstructure requires no effort but that of natural deduction. The first necessary deduction will be, that the people will form an equal representative government; in which it will be impossible for_orders_ or _privileges_ to exist for a moment; and consequently the first materials for standing armies will be converted into peaceable members of the state. Another deduction follows, That the people will be universally armed: they will assume those weapons for security, which the art of war has invented for destruction. You will then have removed the _necessity_ of a standing army by the organization of the legislature, and the _possibility_ of it by the arrangement of the militia; for it is impossible for an armed soldiery to exist in an armed nation, as for a nobility to exist under an equal government. [Here, Barlow makes the theoretical point that having one class of citizens armed, and another unarmed, is inherently anti-democratic, and that to establish such a situation amounts to establishing a privileged class (or "order" as he calls it in the title). --KB] It is curious to remark how ill we reason on human nature, from being accustomed to view it under the disguise which the unequal governments of the world have imposed upon it. During the American war, and especially towards its close, General Washington might be said to possess the hearts of all the Americans. His recommendation was law, and he was able to command the whole power of that people for any purpose of defence. The philosophers of Europe considered this as a dangerous crisis to the cause of freedom. They _knew_ from the example of Caesar, and Sylla, and Marius, and Alcibiades, and Pericles, and Cromwell, that Washington would never lay down his arms, till he had given his country a master. But after he did lay them down, then came the miracle, --his virtue was cried up to be more than human; and it is by this miracle of virtue in him, that the Americans are supposed to enjoy their liberty at this day. I believe the virtue of that great man to be equal to any that has ever yet been known; but to an American eye no extraordinary portion [or, quantity] of it could appear in the transaction. It would have been impossible for the General or the army to have continued in the field after the enemy left it; for the soldiers were all_citizens;_ and if it had been otherwise, their numbers were not the hundredth part of the citizens at large, who were all_soldiers._ To say that he was wise in discerning the impossibility of success in an attempt to imitate the great heroes above mentioned, is to give him only the same merit for sagacity which is common to every other person who knows that country, or who has well considered the effects of equal liberty. * * * A people that legislate for themselves ought to be in the habit of protecting themselves; or they will lose the spirit of both. A knowledge of their own _strength_ preserves a temperance in their own _wisdom,_ and the performance of their _duties_ gives a value to their rights. This is likewise the way to increase the solid domestic [defensive] force of a nation, to a degree far beyond any ideas we form of a standing army; and at the same time annihilate its capacity as well as inclination for foreign aggressive hostilities. The true guarantee of perpetual tranquility at home and abroad, in such a case, would arise from this truth, which would pass into an incontrovertible maxim, _that offensive operations would be impossible, and defensive ones infallible._ [Barlow argues for a defensive militia system like that of Switzerland, which hasn't been involved in a foreign war since_1515,_ except as volunteers with the International Red Cross... --KB] This is undoubtedly the true and only secret of exterminating wars from the face of the earth; and it must afford no small degree of consolation to every friend of humanity, to find this unspeakable blessing resulting from that equal mode of government, which alone secures every other enjoyment for which mankind unite their interests in society. Politicians, and even sometimes honest men, are accustomed to speak of war as an uncontroulable event, falling on the human race like a concussion of the elements, --a scourge which admits no remedy; but for which we must wait with trembling preparation, as for an epidemical disease, whose force we may hope to lighten, but can never avoid. They say that mankind are wicked and rapacious, and 'it must be that offences will come.' This reason applies to individuals, but not to nations deliberately speaking a national voice. I hope I shall not be understood to mean, that the nature of man is totally changed by living in a free republic. I allow that it is still _interested_ men and _passionate_ men, that direct the affairs of the world. But in national assemblies, passion is lost in deliberation, and interest balances interest; till the good of the whole community combines the general will. Here then is a great moral entity, acting still from interested motives; but whose interest it never can be, in any possible combination of circumstances, to commence an offensive war. There is another consideration, from which we may argue the total extinction of wars, as a necessary consequence of establishing governments on the representative wisdom of the people. We are all sensible that superstition is a blemish of human nature, by no means confined to subjects connected with religion. Political superstition is almost as strong as religious [superstition]; and it is quite as universally used as an instrument of tyranny. To enumerate the variety of ways in which this instrument operates on the mind, would be more difficult, than to form a general idea of the result of its operations. In monarchies, it induces men to spill their blood for a particular family, or for a particular branch of that family, who happens to have been born first, or last, or to have been taught to repeat a certain creed, in preference to other creeds. But the effect which I am going chiefly to notice is that which respects the territorial boundaries of a government. For a man in Portugal or Spain to prefer belonging to one of those nations rather than the other, is as much a superstition, as to prefer the house of Braganza to that of Bourbon, or Mary the second of England to her brother. All these subjects of preference stand upon the same footing as the turban and the hat, the cross and the crescent, or the lily and the rose. The boundaries of nations have been fixed for the accomodation of the _government,_ without the least regard to the convenience of the people. Kings and ministers, who make a profitable trade of governing, are interested in extending the limits of their dominion as far as possible. They have a property in the people, and in the territory that they cover. The country and its inhabitants are to them a farm flocked with sheep. When they call up the sheep to be sheared, they teach them to know their [master's] names, to follow their master, and avoid a stranger. By this unaccountable imposition it is, that men are led from one extravagant folly to another, [such as] --to adore their King, to boast of their nation, and to wish for conquest, --circumstances equally ridiculous within themselves, and equally incompatible with that rational estimation of things, which arises from the science of liberty. In America it is not so. Among the several states, the governments are all equal in their force, and the people are all equal in their rights. Were it possible for one state to conquer another State, without any expence of money, or of time, or of blood, --neither of the states, nor a single individual in either of them, would be richer or poorer for the event. The people would all be upon their own lands, and engaged in their own occupations, as before; and whether the territory on which they live were called New York or Massachusetts is a matter of total indifference, about which they have no superstition. For the people belong not to the government, but the government belongs to the people. * * * It is found, that questions about the boundaries between free States are not matters of interest, but merely of form and convenience. And though these questions may involve a tract of country equal to a European kingdom, it alters not the case; they are settled as merchants settle the course of exchange between two commercial cities. Several instances have occured, since the revolution, of deciding in a few days, by amicable arbitration, territorial disputes, which determine the jurisdiction of larger and richer tracts of country, than have formed the objects of all the wars of the last two centuries between France and Germany." --Joel Barlow (1754-1812), _Advice to the Privileged Orders in the several States of Europe, resulting from the necessity and propriety of a general revolution in the principles of government,_ p.24 and 61-69 (London, 1792-1793) <> "He that would make his own liberty secure, must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty, he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself." --Thomas Paine (1737-1809), conclusion,_Dissertation on First Principles of Government,_(Paris, July [4?,]1795) <> (continued) 2/4 -- **x*dna Ken Barnes, LifeSci Bldg. ________Vote_________ NRA *(==) * The University Of Memphis |=*===*===*===*===*=| JPFO * \' * Memphis, TN | Gramm/Alexander96!| GOP *(=)*** [k--ar--s] at [cc.memphis.edu] |___________________| U-U Take It From Bill, Kids: Don't Inhale!