From: [h--b--y] at [pilot.njin.net] (Hubey) Newsgroups: soc.culture.bosna-herzgvna,soc.culture.british,soc.culture.europe,alt.current-events.bosnia,talk.politics.guns Subject: Re: More disinformation from the usual sources (was Re: Young Staffers) Date: 27 Jun 93 16:06:33 GMT The Balkan Quagmire Myth By J.P. Mackley The Washington Post, March 7, 1993 Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina - In recent weeks, politicians and diplomats alike have offered vast quantities of rhetoric that have served in place of hard intelligence in arguments against U.S.-led military intervention. Opponents of military action have variously determined the Serbs to be unbeatable, the Balkan conflict a Vietnam-like quagmire and the terrain too mountainous to be vulnerable, even to high-tech U.S. airpower. A favorite argument supporting Serb invincibility is that Serb forces tied up 16 German divisions in World War II. The truth is that the Germans destroyed the entire Yugoslav Army and occupied that country in a matter of days. Not until the end of the war, after the allies occupied Italy and began to send massive aid and air support, did Tito's partisans became a viable force. People who argue that U.S. forces might now find themselves locked in mortal combat with a formidable Yugoslav army must have missed the battle of Vukovar in 1991. During that action, 1,000 to 1,500 unorganized, ragtag Croatians, equipped with only infantry arms, held off 25,000 Yugoslav troops backed by heavy artillery, hundreds of tanks and MiGs for three months - until their ammunition ran out. After witnessing combat in Vietnam and Desert Storm, spending a major part of the past 18 months in disintegrating Yugoslavia, talking with hundreds of reporters and military people and visiting most of the battle areas, my conclusion is that by almost any American standard, the Serbs aren't very good militarily. No unit of the Yugoslav army or air force, regular or irregular, could compete successfully with a similar size and type of U.S. military unit in anything but a drinking contest. Indeed, the Serbs do their best fighting against unarmed women and the elderly. Two weeks ago, when I traveled across Bosnia with Rep. Frank McCloskey, D-Ind., we were accompanied by a Marine artillery captain who later reported his findings to Marine Corps headquarters. After touring a number of abandoned Serb positions, Capt. Scott Buren concluded that the Serbs were using the same tactics that were used to fight the American Civil War. Buren said that it would be a simple matter for U.S. Marines to handle the Serbs by air or on the ground. If the United States did not choose to send in ground troops, U.S. fighter pilots could still clear the air over Bosnia in less time than it took in Iraq and with far less trouble. But merely enforcing the "no-fly zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina won't do much to influence the outcome of the war either way because Serb aircraft have not been a meaningful factor in the ground war. The Serbs have some MiG-29s, but they are flying lower-maintenance, less-fuel-consuming 1960s-vintage MiG-21s and MiG-23s, and the Russians didn't let them have strategic bombers. Aside from the psychological terror of sudden sonic booms, and the occasional dropping of U.S.- and U.K.-made cluster bomb units on civilian targets, Serb aircraft have been tactically ineffective. Yugoslav pilots simply don't fly the training hours they need to stay "hot." A good example of their bombing ability is the bridge between Bosanki Brod, a town in Bosnia, and Slovonski Brod, the neighboring town in Croatia. Serb MiGs bombed that 150-foot bridge daily for three months, hit it only six times and failed even to make it unusable. It was finally blown up by retreating Croatians and Muslims. Serb forces are structured on the same Soviet model used by Iraqi forces. Although the Iraqis have far more infantry, both they and the Serbs are heavily dependent on tanks and artillery and don't have much stomach for going toe-to-toe with armed adversaries. Although the fighting in Bosnia is usually described as fierce, it is more accurately described as brutal. With few exceptions, there has not been much large-scale combat between any of the opposing forces during the entire war in Yugoslavia. Neither the Serbs, the Croatians nor the Muslims have the organizational ability or communications to orchestrate battle maneuvers on much of a scale. Except for the city siege situations and a few large battles, the combat has been mostly spontaneous, more resembling heavily armed anarchy than organized warfare. Warfare in former Yugoslavia falls into four categories: 1) siege situations in which heavily armored Serbs employ artillery fire to cut off and wear down defenders occupying fixed positions; 2) house-to-house fighting where largely unorganized small groups spray automatic fire at each other until the side that runs out of ammunition retreats; 3) largely unopposed movements against villages full of civilians; 4) small-unit commando raids. The Serbian Army has absolutely no infantry to protect its tanks and artillery; that infantry disappeared when Croatians, Albanians and Macedonians deserted from the Yugoslav army. There is a definite chain of command from Slobodan Milosevic on down, but only a small portion of the 80,000 Serb troops respond to any sort of command. What drives the majority are the inflammatory emotions generated by plum brandy and relentless nationalistic propaganda. In the Serbian military, command, control and communication systems are virtually nonexistent. All of the equipment in use by the Serbs in Bosnia is antiquated by any but Third World standards. Most of it was introduced in the late 1960s. The Serbs are using low-tech T-33 and T-55 tanks, and their mortars and artillery pieces lack any kind of sophisticated fire control systems. Their antiaircraft capability is largely artillery of the type the North Vietnamese used 20 years ago. Saddam Hussein had better air defenses. Fortunately, a Desert Storm scenario isn't necessary in Bosnia. One U.S. armored division and one mechanized infantry division backed by airpower could probably clean up Bosnia in 30 days if they were sent in to fight. But sending the 82nd Airborne into Bosnia, as Lord Owen suggests, merely to bolster U.N. troops already mired in a Beirut-type defensive posture would risk American lives needlessly. A better plan would be to declare a "no-artillery zone" throughout Yugoslavia. Ninety percent of both civilian and military casualties in Bosnia are caused by Serb artillery - large, high visibility items (not short-range mortar tubes like the Viet Cong used in the jungle) and tank main guns, firing harassment and interdiction. Any heavy gun discovered firing by electronic surveillance could be targeted from the air, no matter if it were Serb, Croatian or Muslim. Even the Russians, whose historical support for Serbia has worried Western negotiators, could not object to an equal opportunity moratorium on artillery fire. A "no artillery zone" ultimatum would quickly cool the hot war. Even neutralizing the concentrations of artillery around the cities under siege would provide Croatian and Muslim infantry with a level playing field. Since the Serbs have demonstrated no taste for equal combat, it is unlikely that the combat would continue. As in Desert Storm, ground troops would play only a slight role. In Iraq, generally, they occupied the territory, policed the prisoners and mopped up a few hold-out units after the high-tech airpower got through. For the very first time in the history of warfare, electronic targeting and smart weapons annihilated an enemy army on the ground. Some in the Pentagon argue that Bosnia is not Iraq, and they are right; in many ways airpower could be even more effective against the Serbs. The Iraqis had an entire desert in which to hide tanks and artillery, whereas the Serb heavy weapons and tanks are limited to flat areas near roads in the rocky and mountainous terrain. And in wintertime Bosnia, unlike the Iraqi desert, numerous fires in troop areas and lots of running tank engines generate heat signatures for air-to-ground missiles to lock on to. In Iraq, supplies could come from anywhere across thousands of miles of desert. But all of the supplies - every liter of fuel - feeding the Serb effort in Bosnia have to come across a half dozen bridges spanning either the Danube or the Drina rivers. Diesel fuel, which propels the tanks and trucks, is a perishable commodity and freshly refined supplies are constantly required. If the movement of fuel and spare parts across those rivers stops, so does the ability of mechanized Serbia to wage war. It may be useful to note that the same officers who grossly overestimated the Iraqis - who were, in any case, far larger and better organized and equipped than the entire Serb army - are now prolonging debate over disintegrating Yugoslavia by overinflating the capabilities of the Serbs. But those who delay taking decisive actions to end hostilities are playing right into Milosevic's hands. When Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced U.S. support for continuation of the Vance/Owen negotiations, analysts on Belgrade television saw it as a victory for Milosevic. Serbian voters, convinced of Milosevic's ability literally to get away with murder, overwhelmingly returned him to office, and so far he has not been proven wrong. If the United States suddenly silenced the heavy guns, blocked Serb supply routes and made it clear that continuing would cost more lives than Serbia can afford to give, Milosevic's political base could dissipate. Neither the resumption of U.S. airlifts nor further negotiations are likely to relieve the suffering of the Bosnian Muslims or reduce the growing threat to Serbia's other neighbors. The problem is that Milosevic will not keep his word. He has never kept his word. And the policies, aggression and duplicity that have allowed the Serbs to choose their own seats at the negotiating table may ultimately engage the United States in an international conflict impervious to any but military solutions. (Mackley served with the infantry in Vietnam and has spent the last year developing a network of foreign press bureaus in Croatia and Bosnia.) ------------------ -- --mark-- Humpty Dumpty