Newsgroups: talk.politics.misc,alt.politics.clinton Subject: Re: Clinton's Wiretapping Initiative From: [c j p] at [pitt.edu] (Casimir J Palowitch) Date: 16 Apr 93 22:33:32 GMT Reprinted from Effector Online 5.06 without permission of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (full text and membership info ftp.eff.org pub/EFF): -------------begin reprint from Effector Online 5.06------------- ... The Clinton Administration today made a major announcement on cryptography policy which will effect the privacy and security of millions of Americans. The first part of the plan is to begin a comprehensive inquiry into major communications privacy issues such as export controls which have effectively denied most people easy access to robust encryption as well as law enforcement issues posed by new technology. However, EFF is very concerned that the Administration has already reached a conclusion on one critical part of the inquiry, before any public comment or discussion has been allowed. Apparently, the Administration is going to use its leverage to get all telephone equipment vendors to adopt a voice encryption standard developed by the National Security Agency. The so-called "Clipper Chip" is an 80-bit, split key escrowed encryption scheme which will be built into chips manufactured by a military contractor. Two separate escrow agents would store users' keys, and be required to turn them over law enforcement upon presentation of a valid warrant. The encryption scheme used is to be classified, but they chips will be available to any manufacturer for incorporation into their communications products. This proposal raises a number of serious concerns . First, the Administration appears to be adopting a solution before conducting an inquiry. The NSA-developed Clipper chip may not be the most secure product. Other vendors or developers may have better schemes. Furthermore, we should not rely on the government as the sole source for Clipper or any other chips. Rather, independent chip manufacturers should be able to produce chipsets based on open standards. Second, an algorithm can not be trusted unless it can be tested. Yet the Administration proposes to keep the chip algorithm classified. EFF believes that any standard adopted ought to be public and open. The public will only have confidence in the security of a standard that is open to independent, expert scrutiny. Third, while the use of the split-key, dual-escrowed system may prove to be a reasonable balance between privacy and law enforcement needs, the details of this scheme must be explored publicly before it is adopted. What will give people confidence in the safety of their keys? Does disclosure of keys to a third party waive individual's fifth amendment rights in subsequent criminal inquiries? In sum, the Administration has shown great sensitivity to the importance of these issues by planning a comprehensive inquiry into digital privacy and security. However, the "Clipper chip" solution ought to be considered as part of the inquiry, not be adopted before the discussion even begins. --------------end reprinting from Effector Online 5.06------------- If you are as concerned about this as I am, please join with groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility and others who are lobbying for protection of electronic privacy. Please call your Congresspersons and tell them to vote this down, and prevent sanctioned government wiretapping. - -- ** Casimir J. (Casey) Palowitch - In 1996, there will be two kinds ** ** Slavic Cataloger - of computer professional : those ** ** U. of Pgh. Library Systems - who know NeXTStep, and those ** ** [c j p] at [pitt.edu] - without Jobs. **