From: [m c collum] at [ix.netcom.com] (Jim McCollum) Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns,us.legal Subject: Re: the rules of engagement at Ruby Ridge+FBI Glenn Date: 29 May 1995 05:36:42 GMT Here's a letter from on the scene FBI agent Glenn ================================================================ U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Salt Lake City, UT, May 3, 1995. Michael E. Shaheen, Office of Professional Responsibility, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Shaheen: The purpose of this letter is to request the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) conduct an investigation into the conduct of FBI Associate Special Agent in Charge (A-SAC) Charles Mathews, III and possibly others during the period A-SAC Mathews served on special assignment in Washington, D.C. from October through December, 1994, preparing the Administrative Summary Report regarding the conduct of FBI personnel involved in the Ruby Ridge matter. As a key participant in the events of Ruby Ridge, I believe I was not adequately or fully interviewed, yet the investigative report was relied upon in proposing discipline against me and other FBI Agents. As is explained below, this and other investigative deficiencies reveal a purpose to create scapegoats and false impressions, rather than uncovering or reinforcing the reality of what happened at Ruby Ridge. A-SAC Mathews was provided with the 1994 Ruby Ridge report of Department of Justice (DOJ) Attorney Barbara Berman, along with sixteen issues raised by the DOJ during their review of the Berman Report. These issues concern alleged misconduct by FBI employees. His assignment as preparer of the Administrative Summary Report was: evaluate existing documentation contained in the Berman report for evidence of misconduct, review additional documentation within the FBI that was not a part of the Berman report, and conduct or have conducted appropriate investigation to either substantiate or refute each allegation. INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS As is clearly documented in subsequent portions of this letter, A-SAC Mathews conducted his administrative review with little regard to FBI policy and procedure, and as such his Administrative Summary Report is critically flawed. For example, A-SAC Mathews did not follow the FBI Manual Of Administrative Operations and Procedures (MAOP) as it pertains to interviews of employees under criminal or administrative inquiry. Section 13-4 of the MAOP is particularly relevant as follows: `13-4 Interviews of Employees Involved `(1) Interviews of employees involved in allegations of criminality or serious misconduct should be conducted at the earliest logical time and in a forthright manner. There should be no evasiveness on the part of the Bureau official conducting the interview. `(2) The employee should be fully and specifically advised of the allegations which have been made against him/her in order that he/she may have an opportunity to fully answer and respond to them. . . . `(3) Such interviews must be complete and thorough with all pertinent information obtained and recorded so that all phases of the allegations may be resolved. . . . `(4) The inquiry shall not be complete until the specific allegations that may justify disciplinary action are made known to the employee who may be disciplined and the employee is afforded reasonable time to answer the specific allegations. The employee's answers, explanations, defenses, etc., should be recorded in the form of a signed, sworn statement which should specifically include the allegations made against the employee in an introductory paragraph. The statement is to be prepared following an in-depth interview of the employee by the division head or designated supervisory representative. The employee is not merely to be asked to give a written response to the allegations, but is to be interviewed in an interrogatory fashion, and a signed, sworn statement prepared from the results by the interviewing official. . . .' MATHEWS ACTIONS I have enclosed and request your review of the following: (1) the form `Warning and Assurance to Employee Required to Provide Information' (FD-645) which states, `This inquiry pertains to Allegations of misconduct relating to the Rules of Engagement established for the Ruby Ridge critical incident and whether the FBI fully and adequately participated in the investigation/prosecution of Weaver/Harris,' and (2) the compelled signed statement of Eugene F. Glenn dated December 8, 1994, provided by A-SAC Mathews and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) Jerry R. Donahoe, in which paragraph two reads, `I have been informed that this inquiry pertains to allegations of misconduct relating to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) established for the Ruby Ridge critical incident and whether the FBI fully and adequately participated in the investigation/prosecution of Weaver/Harris.' It should be noted that my ten-page signed statement dated December 8, 1994, details liaison issues concerning the FBI, Salt Lake City and the United States Attorney's (USA's) Office, Boise, Idaho, for a period of time prior to the Ruby Ridge incident and extending through the Harris/Weaver trial. No questions were asked regarding `rules of engagement.' Specifically, I was not asked why I had allegedly approved the rules of engagement or more basically who had approved the rules of engagement. I was never informed that I faced possible disciplinary action for my alleged approval of the rules of engagement. And although contrary to the printed purpose of the inquiry as set forth on the FD-645, supra, A-SAC Mathews stated during the beginning of this interview, `The rules of engagement are considered unconstitutional; therefore, there is no need to further discuss them.' This is clearly in conflict with the MAOP citation 13-4(2)&(4) above. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT I direct your attention to an excerpt from an article that appeared in `Legal Times,' on March 6, 1995, captioned, `DOJ Report May halt FBI Official's Rise.' This article is based on a review of the DOJ Ruby Ridge report prepared by Barbara Berman. Apparently this report was leaked to the media during late February, 1995. The `Legal Times' article states: `In the Reno inquiry, Potts had told investigators that he never approved the final rules of engagement, the guidelines governing a particular operation. Reno has refused to release the 542-page report, saying that she would wait until the local district attorney in Boundary County, Idaho, completes an investigation into whether agents should be charged with murder. `But according to testimony contained in the report, which was obtained by Legal Times, Potts did approve the shoot-on-sight rule. `The task force found that FBI operatives on the ground in Idaho faxed an operational plan, including the proposed rules of engagement, to headquarters for approval by Potts and his then deputy, Danny Coulson. But according to Freeh, Coulson had questions about other facets of the operation discussed and did not notice, let alone read, the rules of engagement. Potts, who had been working on the matter for 36 straight hours, was not on duty at the time and, hence, did not see the written rules. `But Eugene Glenn, the on-site commander of the FBI operation, says in a January 1994 declaration that he believes he had already obtained Potts' approval by telephone before the shooting. `The Reno task force also seemed to give credence to Glenn's account. `(I)t is inconceivable to us that FBI Headquarters remained ignorant of the exact wording of the Rules of Engagement during the entire period,' the report says. `But FBI officials dispute Glenn's account and criticize the Justice Department's report as flawed. `When you piece together the evidence as best as possible after the fact, we reached our best judgment, and that's reflected in the discipline that the director announced or proposed,' says FBI General Counsel Howard Shapiro, who was directly involved in the FBI's inquiry. `Freeh and Potts both declined comment. `I can't speak for the director personally,' Shapiro says, `but a lot turned on the fact that Potts had not approved the final form of the rules of engagement, which are admittedly problematic. Had we found otherwise, it surely would have been grounds for further sanction,' the general counsel adds. `Shapiro declined to elaborate, saying that the FBI's conclusions about what happened are based on information that Reno has said the bureau must not release pending the outcome of the local investigation.' I have never been interviewed/interrogated regarding the rules of engagement. I was not made aware of the charge that I had approved the rules of engagement. Additionally, HRT Commander Dick Rogers, SAC Bill Gore, and SAC Robin Montgomery were not interviewed/interrogated regarding the rules of engagement during A-SAC Mathews' preparation of the Administrative Summary Report. FBIHQ APPROVAL OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT I had been interviewed previously on two occasions: during September, 1992 as part of the Shooting Incident Report, and again on January 12, 1994, as part of the Berman DOJ inquiry. It is specifically detailed in the Shooting Incident Report that the rules of engagement were approved at FBI Headquarters. I call your attention to the following pages: Administrative Section, Cover Page #, Paragraph 1; Report Synopsis, Page 2, Lines 3 through 7; the body of the report, Page 3, Paragraph 2; Dick Rogers signed statement, Page 2, Paragraph 2 through Page 3, Paragraph 2; and signed statement of Eugene F. Glenn, Page 5, Paragraph 2 through Page 6, Paragraph 1; and also to then Assistant Director Potts' signed statement where he articulates as part of this report that he approved the rules of engagement. The DOJ inquiry covered a broad period of time and touched only briefly on rules of engagement. Questioning concerning who approved the rules of engagement was not addressed in detail by interviewing officials during the preparation of my signed statement. Questions concerning who approved the rules of engagement did not appear to be a critical issue to be developed at the time of the Berman report. It should be noted that on September 30, 1992, the date of the Shooting Report, there was no discussion regarding who approved the rules of engagement. The report simply states that the rules of engagement were approved at FBI Headquarters. It is also noted that the Shooting Review Committee Report, dated November 9, 1992, once again concurred that FBI Headquarters approved the rules of engagement. According to the `Legal Times' article dated March 6, 1995, the DOJ findings were, `(I)t is inconceivable to us that FBI Headquarters remained ignorant of the exact wording of the Rules of Engagement during the entire period.' There was no indication that the rules of engagement presented to field command at Ruby Ridge on Saturday, August 22, 1992, differed in any way from the rules of engagement Larry Potts advised he approved during his signed, sworn statement taken during the creation of the Shooting Review Report. It was only after the interviewing began that pertained to the DOJ inquiry headed up by Barbara Berman (over one year after the incident) that statements began to waiver with regard to responsibility for approval of the rules of engagement. In the absence of approved and recognized investigative methods and techniques, A-SAC Mathews managed to take a quantum leap from the factual basis documented in three previous reports to a position of placing the blame for approval of the rules of engagement on SAC Eugene F. Glenn. It should be noted that this remarkable conclusionary quantum leap by A-SAC Mathews was accomplished without the benefit of any additional pertinent interviews of the logical parties who were aware of the rules of engagement approval process. With regard to then Assistant Director Potts, his signed statement taken on September 24, 1992, (a part of the Shooting Review Report), advised that he jointly prepared the rules of engagement with HRT Commander Dick Rogers while Rogers was flying from Washington, D.C. to Northern Idaho to carry out his assigned task as HRT Commander on-scene during Ruby Ridge. On Saturday morning, August 22, 1992, HRT Commander Rogers presented SACs Glenn and Gore with the OPS Plan that included the rules of engagement; he advised how these rules had been prepared during the flight from Washington, D.C. to Northern Idaho and that then Assistant Director Potts was involved in the preparation of these rules of engagement and that Potts had approved them. On August 22, 1992, then Assistant Director Potts advised during a telephonic conversation with SAC Glenn that he had approved the rules of engagement, and he articulated his reasons for these adjustments to the Bureau's standard shooting policy. During the ten days of the Ruby Ridge stand-off there were several occasions when SAC Glenn and AD Potts telephonically communicated with one another, and during these conversations they mutually agreed that the rules of engagement should continue to exist. On Wednesday, August 26, 1992, AD Potts approved the FBI returning to the standard shooting policy. This is reflected in the SIOC Log, page 31, item 7, as follows: `7) AD Potts and SAC Glenn agreed effective 1:00 p.m. EDT, 8/26/92, that the rules of engagement have changed and that they are now that we should fire only in accordance with current FBI shooting policy. . . .' FBIHQ OVERSIGHT OF CRISIS SITUATIONS During the January 6, 1995, press conference given by Director Freeh concerning discipline of FBI Agents involved in Ruby Ridge, the Director stated that Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Coulson had not read the rules of engagement. If this, in fact, were true, I do not understand how such a dereliction could be accepted from an individual whose sole purpose for being in SIOC during this crisis was to be in command of FBI operations at Ruby Ridge. It is a long-standing FBI procedure that any time SIOC is in operation, all investigative plans, operations plans, and tactical initiatives are approved by the individual in charge of SIOC. This point can be testified to by any SAC present or former who has ever served during a crisis with SIOC in operation. Additionally, it can be testified to by any local, state, or county law enforcement officer who has worked jointly with the FBI during a crisis incident with SIOC in operation. I have had several local and state officers come forward who will testify that they witnessed this above-described procedure during the Singer-Swapp crisis in Utah in 1988. Additionally, officials of the U.S. Marshal's Service (USMS) were present at Ruby Ridge in 1992 and witnessed the procedure when the operations plan, which on page two contained the rules of engagement, was sent via facsimile to FBI Headquarters on Saturday, August 22, 1992, at 12:15 PM PST, and to the USMS Headquarters simultaneously. At 12:30 PM, PST, the USMS Headquarters responded they had no objections to the operations plan. Bureau approval was not obtained for the operations plan until the negotiation annex was faxed back to FBI Headquarters. At that time DAD Coulson advised he approved the operations plan. DAD Coulson relieved AD Potts on Saturday, August 22, 1992. It is reasonable to assume that AD Potts fully briefed DAD Coulson regarding the activities surrounding the Ruby Ridge matter, including rules of engagement, prior to turning over command responsibilities to him. I call your attention to the SIOC Log, page 8, time 18:04, which reads as follows: `DAD Coulson sent a facsimile to SAC Glenn re questions regarding the Operations Plan submitted by SAC Salt Lake. 1. No mention is made of Sniper Observer deployment as of 5:30 p.m. EST--(2:30 PST) 2. What intelligence has been gathered from the crisis point? 3. There is no mention of a Negotiation Strategy to secure release of individuals at the crisis point. 4. There is no mention of any attempt to negotiate at all. 5. SAC Salt Lake is requested to consider negotiation strategy and advise FBIHQ. FBIHQ is not prepared to approve the plan as submitted at this time.' FBIHQ ACTIONS ON OPERATIONS PLAN When DAD Coulson received the operations plan on Saturday, August 22, 1992, he telephonically advised SAC Glenn he could not approve the operations plan because it contained nothing about negotiation strategy. DAD Coulson and SAC Glenn had a lengthy telephone conversation concerning the points 1 through 5 set forth in the previous paragraph. Item 1 which deals with sniper observer deployment was discussed at length. It should be noted there were over 200 members of HRT, FBI SWAT team members, and other tactical and investigative units who were all held in camp and were not deployed, including sniper observers, until after DAD Coulson had received the crisis negotiation annex to the operations plan and at that time the field command was free to move sniper observer teams into forward positions. The sniper log verifies that snipers were in position at 5:07 PM, Pacific Daylight Time (8:07 PM, Eastern Daylight Time), which is after DAD Coulson had approved the operations plan containing the rules of engagement. There is no logic to the assumption that FBI leadership responsible for field command at Ruby Ridge would fax the operations plan containing the rules of engagement to FBI Headquarters and USMS Headquarters (receiving approval from the latter) and then deploy FBI resources prior to receiving approval from SIOC, FBI Headquarters. Is it logical to conclude that the two FBI SACs and the FBI HRT Commander on the scene would have mutually concurred to deploy FBI resources absent prior SIOC approval? 2. What intelligence has been gathered from the crisis point? 3. There is no mention of a Negotiation Strategy to secure release of individuals at the crisis point. 4. There is no mention of any attempt to negotiate at all. 5. SAC Salt Lake is requested to consider negotiation strategy and advise FBIHQ. FBIHQ is not prepared to approve the plan as submitted at this time.' FBIHQ ACTIONS ON OPERATIONS PLAN When DAD Coulson received the operations plan on Saturday, August 22, 1992, he telephonically advised SAC Glenn he could not approve the operations plan because it contained nothing about negotiation strategy. DAD Coulson and SAC Glenn had a lengthy telephone conversation concerning the points 1 through 5 set forth in the previous paragraph. Item 1 which deals with sniper observer deployment was discussed at length. It should be noted there were over 200 members of HRT, FBI SWAT team members, and other tactical and investigative units who were all held in camp and were not deployed, including sniper observers, until after DAD Coulson had received the crisis negotiation annex to the operations plan and at that time the field command was free to move sniper observer teams into forward positions. The sniper log verifies that snipers were in position at 5:07 PM, Pacific Daylight Time (8:07 PM, Eastern Daylight Time), which is after DAD Coulson had approved the operations plan containing the rules of engagement. There is no logic to the assumption that FBI leadership responsible for field command at Ruby Ridge would fax the operations plan containing the rules of engagement to FBI Headquarters and USMS Headquarters (receiving approval from the latter) and then deploy FBI resources prior to receiving approval from SIOC, FBI Headquarters. Is it logical to conclude that the two FBI SACs and the FBI HRT Commander on the scene would have mutually concurred to deploy FBI resources absent prior SIOC approval? The question must asked how did DAD Coulson avoid reviewing the rules of engagement which are located on page 2 of the Operation Plan inasmuch as he obviously had reviewed the Operations Plan to come up with the questions as set forth in the SIOC Log, supra. Page 8 of the SIOC Log at 18;30 reads as follows: `SAC Glenn advised DAD Coulson that Portland SWAT team had contact with who they believe was subject approximately 1/4 mile `up canyon' from home. He used profanity and told them to get off property. SAC was reminded of rules of engagement and to treat subject as threat if confronted outside home. SAC is working on negotiation plan.' It is noted that DAD Coulson's reminder to SAC Glenn regarding how to handle Weaver if confronted outside his home is in keeping with the rules of engagement that appeared in the Operations Plan and is not in keeping with the standard Bureau shooting policy. Additionally, there exist two witnesses--one an individual who had a high-level position in SIOC during the operation who advised it was common knowledge that FBI Headquarters approved the rules of engagement; and the second witness is a Bureau Supervisor who served in SIOC on Saturday with DAD Coulson and overheard him discussing the rules of engagement with Bureau Supervisor Tony Betz. CONFLICTS ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPROVAL I am aware that there exist conflicting statements regarding approval of the rules of engagement. Had A-SAC Mathews conducted his administrative review with the ethical standards and integrity normally associated with any FBI Agent, each of the individuals involved (Potts, Coulson, Rogers, Glenn, Gore, and Montgomery) would have been interrogated to resolve any conflicts that appear in their statements regarding rules of engagement. Had interrogation not resolved these conflicts, polygraph examinations should have been mandated as the next logical step. This type of in-depth investigation should have been mandated by A-SAC Mathews prior to any conclusions being drawn concerning who approved the rules of engagement. DEFICIENCIES ON U.S. ATTORNEY LIAISON CONCLUSIONS Instead of being interrogated concerning charges placed against me, I was afforded a telephonic `soft' fact-finding chronology-type review interview concerning liaison with the USA's Office in Boise, Idaho. I was never confronted with the allegations made by former U.S. Attorney Maurice Ellsworth and/or others. Individuals I suggested to A-SAC Mathews that should be contacted to provide additional insight regarding liaison problems that existed with the USA's Office in Boise under Ellsworth's leadership were not contacted, and the current U.S. Attorney in Boise and former Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of Idaho were never contacted to verify the current excellent liaison that exists between the FBI and USA's Office in Boise. It should be noted that U.S. Attorney for the District of Idaho Betty Richardson and former Acting U.S. Attorney Pat Malloy of that office wrote unsolicited letters to both Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis J. Freeh describing the current high quality of liaison that exists between the FBI and the USA's Office in Idaho. It is important to note that according to the DOJ report leaked to the media concerning the Ruby Ridge matter. The criticism leveled in the DOJ investigation focused on liaison discrepancies by Headquarters Units of the FBI and their interaction with the USA's Office in Boise, Idaho. Yet, the Mathews report turned the responsibility for deficiencies in liaison with the USA's Office in Boise, Idaho, to the Salt Lake City Field Division without conducting logical investigative steps and without advising those to be charged with these derelictions of the specific allegations they would be facing. DEFICIENCIES IN MATHEWS REPORT I have not yet been given access to the Mathews Administrative Summary Report; however, I am aware of other areas that were covered within the scope of this inquiry where A-SAC Mathews: (1) failed to develop/gather all evidence regarding liaison between the FBI, Salt Lake City and the USA's Office in Boise; (2) demonstrated unethical conduct by selectively choosing FBI Field Agents for discipline and omitting others involved jointly with those selected for discipline; (3) selectively choosing ASAC Thomas Miller and SAC Michael Kahoe for discipline regarding the Shooting Review Report for `inaccurately and incompletely analyzing the report' while omitting discipline of others who had to have reviewed the report (then Chief Inspector of the Inspection Division, then Assistant Director of the Inspection Division, then Deputy Assistant Director Danny Coulson, CID; then Assistant Director Larry Potts, CID), all of whom had to have read, analyzed, and approved this Shooting Report prior to it being sent to then Deputy Director Doug Gow; (4) and finally, other FBI Agents were interviewed by A-SAC Mathews and were subsequently censured, yet were not advised they were the subjects of an administrative inquiry nor were they given the standard waiver form to sign (FD-645). A-SAC Mathews, a close associate of then DAD Danny Coulson, served as Coulson's ASAC in the Portland Office of the FBI when Coulson was SAC from August 24, 1988, to December 29, 1991. The only logical conclusion that can be drawn to explain the deception and lack of completeness in this investigation is that A-SAC Mathews' relationship with Coulson caused him to avoid the development of the necessary facts, and caused him to cover up facts germane to the central issues. It is beyond conceivability that any FBI Agent with 25 years of experience could have inadvertently presented such an incomplete, inaccurate document as the Administrative Summary Report prepared by A-SAC Mathews. Had A-SAC Mathews demonstrated the ethical standards normally associated with someone in the FBI of his position, he would have recused himself from this assignment because of an obvious conflict of interest. STATUS OF PROPOSED DISCIPLINARY ACTION More than 115 days have passed since I was publicly castigated by Director Freeh during his infamous January 6, 1995, national press conference. To date I have not been given copies of the Administrative Summary Report prepared by A-SAC Mathews, the Department of Justice Report concerning Ruby Ridge prepared in 1994 by Barbara Berman (leaked to the media in February, 1995), the FBI report concerning the Ruby Ridge matter prepared by then Inspector Robert E. Walsh in 1994 (which report parallels the Berman report but presents findings that differ), and other internal documents I have gone on record requesting under the provisions of FOIPA. Since January 6, 1995, the FBI in concert with the DOJ has moved forward to have affirmed the correctness of the discipline handed out to then Assistant Director Potts, and on May 2, 1995, finalized his promotion to Deputy Director of the FBI. This action was taken while my appeal sits unaddressed in the office of Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick. The DOJ, aware that there are unresolved issues concerning responsibility for authorization of the rules of engagement at Ruby Ridge, chose to ignore the opportunity to hear from SAC Glenn and instead took a course of action which further exasperates an already flawed Administrative Review Process. CONCLUSION I request that a thorough OPR inquiry be initiated. There are numerous administrative guidelines and procedures that have been violated, and it is conceivable that federal statutes have been violated. The lack of professionalism demonstrated in the handling of the Administrative Summary Report in connection with the Ruby Ridge matter casts a dark cloud over the integrity of the FBI and the DOJ. I would welcome the opportunity to be interrogated regarding this matter, and would likewise welcome the opportunity to submit to a polygraph examination afforded to me by a professional, nationally-recognized operator with a total independent bearing in this matter. This letter has not been referred directly to OPR, Inspection Division, FBI Headquarters, since it would create a conflict of interest for Assistant Director Gore, who was present and intricately involved in discussions involving the Operations Plan (including rules of engagement) utilized during the Ruby Ridge crisis in Idaho. Respectfully yours, Eugene F. Glenn, Special Agent in Charge, Salt Lake City Division. -- ================================================= _WithOut Remorse_ "Dushman kush!"