From: [i--s--t] at [delphi.com] Newsgroups: talk.politics.guns Subject: Davidian Jury Instructions 4/7 Date: Tue, 22 Feb 94 01:28:34 -0500 AIDING AND ABETTING Count Two alleges that each named Defendant aided and abetted the other Defendants as well as other unknown persons in the commission of this offense. You are instructed as follows with regard to what "aiding and abetting" means: Title 18, United States Code, Section 2, provides that the guilt of a defendant in a criminal case may be established without proof that the defendant personally did every act constituting the offense alleged. The law recognizes that, ordinarily, anything a person can do for himself may also be accomplished by that person through direction of another person as his or her agent, or by acting in concert with, or under the direction of, another person or persons, in a joint effort or enterprise. So, if another person is acting under the direction of a defendant of if the defendant joins another person and performs acts with the intent to commit a crime, then the law holds that defendant responsible for the acts and conduct of such other persons just as though the defendant had committed the acts of engaged in such conduct. Notice, however, that before any defendant may be held crim- inally responsible for the acts of others it is necessary that the accused deliberately associate himself in some way with the crime and participate in it with the intent to bring about the crime. Of course, mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed are not sufficient to establish that a defendant either directed or aided and abetted the crime 36 ---- unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant under consideration was a participant and not merely a knowing spectator. In other words, you may not find the Defendant guilty unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that every element of the offense as defined in these instructions was committed by some person or persons and that the Defendant voluntarily participated in its commission with the intent to violate the law. 37 ---- SELF-DEFENSE In this self-defense instruction, the "male gender" pronouns will include Defendant Ruth Riddle. If a Defendant was not an aggressor, and had reasonable grounds to believe and actually did believe that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm from which he could save himself only by using deadly force against his assailants, he had the right to employ deadly force in order to defend himself. By "deadly force" is meant force which is likely to cause death of serious bodily harm. In order for a Defendant to have been justified in the use of deadly force in self-defense, he must not have provoked the assault on him or have been the aggressor. Mere words without more, do not constitute provocation or aggression. The circumstances under which a Defendant acted must have been such as to produce in the mind of a reasonably prudent person, similarly situated, the reasonable belief that the other persons were then about to kill him or to do him serious bodily harm. In addition, a Defendant must have actually believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm and that deadly force must be used to repel it. If evidence of self-defense is present, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a Defendant did not act in self-defense. If you find that the government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a Defendant did not act in self- defense, you must find that Defendant not guilty. In other words, 38 ---- if you have a reasonable doubt whether of not a Defendant acted in self-defense, your verdict must be not guilty as to that Defendant. If a Defendant had reasonable grounds to believe and actually did believe that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm and that deadly force was necessary to repel such danger, he would be justified in using deadly force in self- defense, even though it may afterwards have turned out that the appearances were false. If these requirements are met, he could use deadly force even though there was in fact neither purpose on the part of the other persons to kill him or do him serious bodily harm, nor imminent danger that it would be done, nor actual necessity that deadly force be used in self-defense. If a Defendant had reasonable grounds to believe and actually did believe that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm and that deadly force was necessary to repel such danger, he was not required to retreat or to consider whether he could safely retreat. He was entitled to stand his ground and use such force as was reasonably necessary under the circumstances to save his life or protect himself from serious bodily harm. However, if a Defendant could have safely retreated but did not do so, his failure to retreat is a circumstance which you may consider, together with all other circumstances, in determining whether he went farther in repelling the danger, real or apparent, then he was justified in doing under the circumstances. Even if the other persons were the aggressors and a Defendant was justified in using force in self-defense, he would not be 39 ---- entitled to use any greater force than he had reasonable grounds to to believe and actually did believe to be necessary under the circumstances to save his life or avert serious bodily harm. In determining whether a Defendant used excessive force in defending himself, you may consider all the cimcumstances under which he acted. The claim of self-defense is not necessarily defeated if greater force than would have seemed necessary in careful reflection was used by a Defendant in the heat of passion generated by an assault upon him. A belief which may be unreasonable in careful reflection may be actually and reasonably entertained in the heat of passion. You must distinguish resisting arrest from self-defense. If you find that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a Defendant knew before he acted that the ATF agents were law- enforcement officers who intended to search Mount Carmel or to arrest one or more of its occupants, and that the Defendant under consideration acted to avoid arrest or to prevent the search of Mount Carmel, you may not acquit that Defendant by reason of self- defense. Additionally, if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a Defendant prepared to ambush the ATF agents upon their arrival at Mount Carmel by changing into combat clothing, gathering pistols or rifles, loading magazines, or distributing hand grenades, you may not acquit that Defendant by reason of self- defense. Generally, the law forbids forcible resistance to law enforcement officers executing search and arrest warrants. 40 ---- Therefore, the general rule is that knowledge of an officer's status in law enforcement would automatically negate any claim of self-defense. However, under the Fourth Amendment, an individual has the right to be free from the use of excessive force by a law enforcement officer even when that officer is making a lawful search or arrest. It has always been a policy of the law to protect the physical integrity of every person from unauthorized violence. This right arises from the Constitution's guarantee to be free from unlawful attack upon one's person. Therefore, if a federal officer uses excessive force, that is, force that is not reasonable under all the circumstances from the officer's viewpoint, a citizen has the right to defend himself from such force. However, the citizen may only use so much force as is necessary to stop the officer's use of excessive force. A citizen may only use deadly force under the circumstances I have already explained to you. Therefore, if you determine that the ATF agents caused the Defendant under consideration to reasonably and honestly believe that he was about to be killed or receive serious bodily harm due to the agents' use of excessive or unreasonable force, then self- defense would be appropriate if all of the above elements are met. On the other hand, if you find that the ATF agents' conduct caused the Defendant under consideration to believe that he or someone similarly situated was about to be arrested or that Mount Carmel was about to be searched, and he acted to resist arrest, then self- defense would not be appropriate. 41 ---- You are instructed that federal agents are not automatically entitled to use deadly force to make an arrest or to conduct a search. If a suspect threatens an officer with a weapon of if there is probably cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm, deadly force may be used to apprehend that suspect. An officer cannot, however, seize an unarmed, non- dangerous suspect by shooting him dead. 42 ---- You are instructed that federal law provides that upon the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, based upon an affidavit containing probable cause, a search warrant may be issued by a federal magistrate for a search of property or for a person within the federal district. Moreover, if it appears from a complaint, a written statement of the facts constituting an offense charged, or from an affidavit or affidavits that an offense has been committed and that the named Defendant has committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the named Defendant shall issue to any officer authorized to execute it. The search and arrest warrants entered into evidence in this case are, as such, lawful process. 43 ---- I have explained what the government has to prove for you to convict a Defendant of aiding and abetting the murder of a federal agent. Your first task is to decide whether the government has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant under consideration committed that crime. If your verdict on that is guilty as to a particular Defendant, you are finished with regard to that Defendant. But if your verdict is not guilty as to a particular Defendant, or if you are unable to reach a verdict as to a particular Defendant, you should then consider whether that Defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. Voluntary manslaughter is committed when a human being is killed unlawfully in the sudden heat of passion caused by adequate provocation. In order for a particular Defendant to be guilty of voluntary manslaughter, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the government has proved the following elements: First: That the Defendant under consideration aided and abetted the killing of ATF Special Agents Steven D. Willis, Robert Williams, Conway C. LeBleu and Todd W. McKeehan without lawful justification; Second: That the persons killed were federal officers as described below, who were then engaged in the performance of their official duty, as charged; Third: That the Defendant under consideration acted in the heat of passion; and Fourth: That the heat of passion was caused by an adequate provocation. 44 ---- For a determination of whether the person killed was a federal officer who was engaged in the performance of his official duty, refer to the explanation on page __ of these Instructions. For a full explanation of "aiding and abetting," refer to page ___ of these Instructions. "Heat of passion" is such a passion or emotion as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an ordinary reasonable person of average disposition in the same or similar circumstances as confronted the Defendant under consideration at the time the killing occurred. It is such a state of passion, or hot blood, or rage, anger, resentment, terror or fear as to indicate the absence of deliberate design to kill or as to cause one to act on impulse without reflection. Thus, the law does not consider the peculiarities of a particular Defendant's nature or temperament or condition. It will occur to you that the underlying reason for this rule is the same as that which was the basis of the "reasonable man" rule in the law of self-defense. The passion which was aroused from the facts and circumstances that confronted the Defendant under consideration must be such as also would have aroused the passion of an ordinarily reasonable person likewise situated. The basic inquiry is whether or not at the time of the killing, the reason and judgement of the Defendant under consideration was obscured or disturbed by passion--or dethroned, to use another expression--to such an extent as would cause an ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly 45 ---- and without deliberation and from passion rather than judgement. Before you may find that the Defendant under consideration acted in the heat of passion, you must also find that there was "adequate provocation." Provocation, in order to be adequate to reduce the offense from murder to voluntary manslaughter, must be such as might naturally induce a reasonable man in the passion of the moment to lose self-control and to act on impulse and without reflection. A blow or other personal violence may constitute adequate provocation. But a trivial or slight provocation, entirely disproportionate to the violence of the retaliation, is not adequate provocation to reduce the offense from murder to voluntary manslaughter. Mere words standing alone, however, no matter how insulting, no matter how offensive, no matter how abusive, are not adequate to reduce the offense. You should ask yourself whether the ordinarily reasaonable man, placed in the same situation in which the Defendant under consideration found himself or herself, and knowing what the Defendant under consideration then knew or believed he or she knew, have been thrown into such heat of passion? 46 ----