From: Christopher B Reeve <[cr 39] at [andrew.cmu.edu]> Organization: Sophomore, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA Progress of the WOD "A 1988 report by the American Bar Association noted: Police, prosecutors and judges told the committee that they have been unsuccessful in making a significant impact on the importation, sale and use of illegal drugs, despite devoting much of their resources to the arrest, prosecution and trial of drug offenders. [American Bar Association. (1988). Criminal Justice in Crisis: Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association. pages 6, 44.] The authors of the report concluded that the drug problem was 'severe, growing worse, and ... law enforcement has been unable to control it.' City officials have also noted that the problems associated with criminalized drug use and drug trafficking are severe and growing worse. In a survey of elected officials conducted by the National Leage of Cities in January 1990, 58 percent of the chief officials of cities surveyed maintained that problems associated with drugs had grown worse during the previous year. An additional 31 percent reported that drug problems had remained the same [New York Times. (1/9/90). The Drug War: Toll Increases in U.S. Cities: 6.] Almost every indicator points to the ineffectiveness of enforcement strategies to do more than temporarily decrease drug use and the problems associated with illegal drug use and trafficking. Temporary decreases, however, are widely hailed by the administration as evidence of the success of enforcement strategies." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 2) "One of the real beauties of the War on Drugs is that failure and progress can be claimed as an excuse to continue and expand the war. Evidence of expanding drug abuse can be used to frighten the public into allowing even greater efforts and expenditures in the drug war. Evidence of limited successes can be used to support the notion that progress is being made, victory is in sight, if only the fight is continued." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 10 - 11) "'If we measure the success of the current Federal drug abuse control strategy by looking at the number of drug users and amounts of drugs entering the country,' the report said, 'we must conclude that our present strategy, which emphasizes supply reduction, is not very effective' [Berke, Richard L. (6/9/89). U.S. Attack on Airborne Drug Smuggling Called Ineffective. New York Times: A10.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 42) "The logic behind continued prison construction and the continuation of the War on Drugs seems to be something like this: Prisons have been a failure, so more prisons will be a success; punishment has been a failure, so more punishment will be a success; criminalization and enforcement have been a failure, so more criminilization and enforcement will be a success. It's not the kind of logic that appeals to every intellect, but it is apparently sufficient for many." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 173) Statisticts and Figures in the WOD "Joseph Treaster, writing in the New York Times [Treaster, Joseph B. (7/1/90). Cocaine Epidemic Has Peaked, Some Suggest. New York Times: 11], noted that many researchers he interviewed at a NIDA conference in July 1990 felt that price increases were most likely due not to a decrease of supply, or disruption of the market due to interdiction, but to attempts of traffickers to drive up the price by holding back on the product. Bush and Bennett, however, used the price increases for cocaine as evidence of the success of the War on Drugs [Christian Science Monitor. (9/7/90). Progress Cited in War on Drugs: 7]. Both the Reagan and Bush administrations have played a shell game with the figures about drugs, widely publicizing figures when they appeared to favor administration policies and conveniently ignoring them when they did not. In 1982, for example, Reagan's advisor on drug policy, Dr. Carlton Turner, argued that decreasing prices for cocaine, marijuana, and heroin did not indicate greater availability but less demand for the drugs [Freemantle, Brian. (1986). The Fix. New York: Tom Doherty Associates. page 52.]. There have been other instances of manipulating the figures for drug use for political reasons. Edward Jay Epstein (1977), for example, has documented how the Nixon administration vastly exaggerated the heroin epidemic of the early 1970s in order to assist Nixon's reelection [Epstein, Edward Jay. (1977). Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America. New York: Putnam's]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 4) "The fact that the administration, through a media campaign, can alter the number of people who approve of drug taking or who are willing to admit using drugs demonstrates very little except the power of the media on the one hand and the increasing fear of surveillance and thus the admission of durg use on the other." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 11) "Survey responses only show a decline in the number of those admitting drug use, not necessarily a decline in actual usage. Government surveys, for example, indicated a decline in drug use among high school seniors in 1989. But one out of every two seniors indicated that they had tried an illicit drug. And as the survey's authors noted, the figures did not include students who had dropped out of high school, who are commonly thought to be more involved in illicit drug use. In some major metropolitan areas, this dropout rate is estimated to be as high as 50 percent [Criminal Justice Newsletter. (3/15/89). Survey Shows Declining Rate of Drug Use by High School Seniors.]. The dropout rate for teenagers overall is 27 percent [Isikoff, Michael. (2/19 - 25/90). Youths Deal a Snub to Drugs. Washington Post National Weekly Edition: 19.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 11) "Nor was it even considered that the quality of the cocaine on the street is directly related to cocaine emergencies. Bennett's deputy chief of staff maintained that the data on cocaine emergencies indicated that drug abuse was no longer 'spiraling out of control' and (with the elegance that has characterized official statements in the Reagan and Bush administrations) that 'bodies [were] not piling up as a result of cocaine or any other drug [Montgomery Advertiser. (5/24/90). Drug Deaths Decline: 4A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 12 - 13) "In a survey of almost 400,000 junior high and high school students conducted by the Parents' Resource Institute for Drug Education, and released in September 1989, it was reported that the percentage of students reporting use had dropped but that those using cocaine were getting higher. Even though the number of students who reported using cocaine decreased, the percentage reporting 'very high' or 'bombed/stoned' from cocaine increased [Skorneck, Carolyn. (9/27/89). Student Cocaine Use Drops. Montgomery Advertiser: 4A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 13) "Figures are frequently cited to indicate that drug and alcohol use is costing industry billions of dollars per year in lost productivity [Bensinger, Peter B. (4/19/90). Fighting Drugs Won't Abuse Workers. USA Today: 12A.]. Almost never are the methods of determining these figures given. Dr. John Morgan, a professor at the City University of New York Medical School, reviewed the evidence behind these figures and has pointed out that the most widely quoted statistics in this regard come from a 1984 report by the Research Triangle Institute (RTI). Morgan termed the reasoning of the RTI analysis 'unclear' and the figures 'questionable.' He concluded that 'zealous advocates of drug use testing have misused data and statistics and quoted 'studies' lacking proper analysis in order to support their own idealogy' [Morgan, John P. (May/June 1989). Impaired Statistics and the Unimpaired Worker. Drug Policy Letter: 4.]. And, as Zimmer [Zimmer, Lynn. (1989). Employment Drug Testing and Its Effectiveness in the War against Drugs. Paper Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Reno, Nevada.] has pointed out, the companies most likely to test are large companies, firms that already have mechanisms in place for dealing with unsatisfactory performance. Drug testing does not even detect impairment or unsatisfactory performance, only recent drug use [Jacoby, Tamar. (11/14/88). Drug Testing in the Dock. Newsweek: 66.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 97 - 98) "In a 1989 Washington Post / ABC News poll, almost three out of ten people questioned favored sentences of life imprisonment or death for those convicted of selling cocaine. Eight out of ten believed that illegal drug use would decline if 'we punished drug users more heavily than we do now.'" (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 113) "in a Washington Post / ABC News poll conducted in 1989, 82 percent of those surveyed said that they favored using the military to control illegal drugs within the United States [Morin, Richard. (9/8/89). Many in Poll Say Bush Plan Is Not Stringent Enough. Washington Post: A18.]" (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 123) "In a poll conducted by the Washington Post / ABC News poll in 1989, 83 percent of the respondents favored encouraging people to phone the police to report drug users even if it meant turning in 'a family member who uses drugs' [Morin, Richard. (9/8/89). Many in Poll Say Bush Plan Is Not Stringent Enough. Washington Post: A18.]. As was noted earlier, participants in on PBS panel argued that they would turn their own children over to the police if they suspected drug use [Public Broadcasting System. (1/6/90). Drug Seminar.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 124) Drug Money / Prices "As one ex-dealer noted to a New York Times reporter, 'The police can arrest me. But as soon as they take me away there are two or three people who come in and take my place. There's too much money involved for it to be any other way' [Marriot, Michel. (6/1/89). The 12 Worst Drug Bazaars: New York's Continuing Blight. New York Times: 1A.]. In fact, arrests of drug dealers often serve only to destabilize the market, and consequently they increase the violence of turf battles between new dealers competing over territories." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 8) "In addition, stepped-up enforcement tends to distort the drug market. Stepped-up enforcement targeting marijuana, for example, drove up prices to such an extent that crack cocaine became a cheaper alternative [Passell, Peter. (9/5/89). How the Traffickers Profited from the War on Marijuana. New York Times: E14.]. In some areas of New York City in mid-1989, crack prices had decreased from $5 a vial to $3, and in addition, tokes were being sold for pocket change [Marriott, Michel. (6/1/89). The 12 Worst Drug Bazaars: New York's Continuing Blight. New York Times: 1A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 9) "In one state, Alabama, the marijuana destroyed in 1989 by state officials was worth more than any other legal cash crop grown in the state [Harper, Sam. (2/18/90). Agents Take Dangerous Forays in Effort to Eradicate Marijuana. Montgomery Advertiser: B1.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 9) "As UCLA sociologist Jack Katz has noted, 'Recent studies indicate that increases in enforcement pressures do not even seem to raise the street price of drugs. They are most likely to increase and concentrate the wealth of the surviving drug dealers' [Katz, Jack. (6/5 - /11/89). No Way to Fight Street Crime. Washington Post National Weekly Edition: 29.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 10) "As Robert B. Reich, a political economist at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, pointed out to a New York Times reporter, 'narcotics is one oof America's major industries right up there with consumer electronics, automobiles, and steelmaking' [Labaton, Stephen. (12/6/89). The Cost of Drug Abuse: $60 Billion a Year. New York Times: 27.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 19) "International efforts to fight the War on Drugs have also ensured that the profit margin on drugs is high. The profits are so large that the Colombian Mafia at one point reputedly offered to pay off the Colombian $10 billion external debt [U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations. 1989. Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.]. The Kerry Commission Report estimated that the Colombian drug cartels earn $8 billion annually [U.S. Senate, 1989: 29], and Forbes magazine listed Colombian cartel leaders Ochoa and Escobar as among hte richest men in the world [7/25/88: 64; cited in U.S. Senate, 1989]. The personal fortune of the Honduran drug trafficker Juan Ramon Matta has been estimated at $1 billion [Rohter, Larry. (4/16/89). As Mexico Moves on Drug Dealers, More Move in. New York Times: 3A.]. One Mexican drug ttrafficker, Felix Gallardo, is believed to have smuggled two tons of cocaine into the United States every month [Rohter, Larry. (4/16/89). As Mexico Moves on Drug Dealers, More Move in. New York Times: 3A.] and to have been paying off the police officials arrested along with him in monthly bribes of five figures. Gallardo is thought to have made hundreds of millions of dollars in his fifteen-year career [Rohter, Larry. (4/16/89). As Mexico Moves on Drug Dealers, More Move in. New York Times: 3A.]. The economies of a number of the more important drug-producing and drug-trafficking countries depend on drug profits. Freemantle [Freemantle, Brian. (1986). The Fix. New York: Tom Doherty Associates. page 211.], for example, maintains that nearly 36 percent of Colombia's gross national product comes from drug profits and that drugs are Colombia's largest source of foreign income. Eddy et al. [Eddy, Paul, Hugo Sabogal, and Sara Walden. (1988). The Cocaine Wars. New York: W. W. Norton adn Company. page 48.] detail the steps in the processing and distributing of cocaine and the profits at each step based on a DEA report from as long ago as 1979. The basic ingredients needed to produce a kilo of cocaine cost $625. Once the coca leaves had been turned into paste, then base, and finally one kilo of cocaine hydrochloride, the value in Colombia was $9,550. By the time this kilo reached the United States, the value was $37,000. The distribution process increases the amount of the product. First, the wholesaler cuts the cocaine to 50 percent purity and sells two kilos for $37,000 each. The distributor cuts it and sells four kilos, and the street dealer (after cutting) sells eight kilos at $70 or more a gram. Thus, $625 worth of coca leaves becomes $560,000 on the street. As Eddy et al. [1988: 49] note, cocaine is 'the most valuable commodity on earth.'" A report by a Senate subcommittee on narcotics in early 1990 estimated that some $300 billion in worldwide drug money is disguised through laundering every year [Barrett, Paul M. (2/9/90). Senate Panel Says Treasury Has Failed to Curb Non-Bank Money Laundering. Wall Street Journal: A12.]. The assistant treasury secretary for enforcement, Salvatore R. Martoche, has estimated that 80 percent of this is pure profit [Isikoff, Michael. (11/6 - /12/89). Drafting Banks into the War on Drugs. Washington Post Natinoal Weekly Edition: 33.]. The profits from drug trafficking are said to be worth as much as oil to the world banking system." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 45) "Lernoux, in fact, has maintained that the economy of Bolivia would 'collapse without cocaine income.' In Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, money earned through drug exports that is returned to the country is greater than money returned from any of the legal exports like coffee, tin, oil, and sugar [MacDonald, Scott B. (1988). Dancing on a Volcano: The Latin American Drug Trade. New York: Praeger. page 5.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 145) "the international drug trade is presently estimated to be worth $500 billion per year. This is more than the international trade in oil and less only than the worth of the international arms trade [Lewis, Paul. (2/21/90). Drugs Pit Baker vs. third World at U.N. New York Times: A3.]" (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 148) Border Interdiction "Harvard economist Mark Kleiman, in his book Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control, has argued that efforts to interdict marijuana coming over the border succeed only in stimulating the domestic market and encouraging the development of more potent strains of marijuana. Kleiman also argues that the assumption that every ton of marijuana confiscated is one less ton consumed is a fantasy [Passell, Peter. (9/5/89). How the Traffickers Profited from the War on Marijuana. New York Times: E14.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 9) "It is estimated that in 1990 the administration will spend over $2 billion in an effort to seal off the border to drug smuggling [Treaster, Joseph B. (4/29/90). Bypassing Borders, More Drugs Flood Ports. New York Times: 1.]. In response to these high-tech interdiction methods, however, smugglers have merely resorted to low-tech means. Tramp steamers out of Haiti, tomato trucks out of Mexico, and large cargo containers have replaced planes and large ships as the preferred form of transport [Magnuson, Ed. (1/22/90). More and More, a Real War. Time: 22.]. For example, in 1990 the U.S. Customs Service noted an increase in the use of containers to smuggle drugs and estimated that one-third to one-half of the cocaine entering the country was smuggled in containers through commercial ports. One senior DEA official interviewed by the New York Times was quoted as saying, 'Everybody's concerned about small planes and fast boats coming in with 500 or 1,000 kilos ... It's cargo containers coming in with thousands of pounds. You're talking bulk. You're talking containers, containers, containers' [Treaster, Joseph B. (4/29/90). Bypassing Borders, More Drugs Flood Ports. New York Times: 1.]. This DEA official noted as well that most of the discoveries of drugs in containers were the result of informant tips, not high-tech surveillance. 'Unless you have an informant providing definitive information that a shipment has cocaine in it,' he stated, 'it usually goes right through.' When Customs tried targeting containers from 'producing' countries, traffickers merely set up shell companies and shipped drugs in containers originating in other countries [Treaster, Joseph B. (4/29/90). Bypassing Borders, More Drugs Flood Ports. New York Times: 1.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 36 - 37) "In May 1990, for example, law enforcement officials found a 300-foot tunnel in Arizona, which they estimated had been used to smuggle cocaine into a warehouse four blocks from the U.S. Customs border checkpoint for at least six months [Squitieri, Tom. (5/21/90). Tunnel Hot Line May Dig Up Drug Clues. USA Today: 3A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 37) "The U.S. border is simply too large and too porous to be adequately sealed. Florida, for example, has a coastline of 395 miles and 6,000 miles of inland waterways [Freemantle, Brian. (1986). The Fix. New York: Tom Doherty Associates. page 47.]. In addition, if interdiction efforts along the border were significantly stepped up, there would be a massive disruption in the flow of trade. For example, it is estimated that 8 million large cargo containers passed through U.S. borders in 1989. Roughly 3 percent of them were checked. If this percentage was increased substantially, the delays would cause havoc and provoke an outcry due to the interference with trade [Magnuson, Ed. (1/22/90). More and More, a Real War. Time: 22.]. Customs officials estimate that even if they had the personnel, they could never search more than 10 percent of incoming containers without causing extensive disruption of trade through U.S. ports [Treaster, Joseph B. (4/29/90). Bypassing Borders, More Drugs Flood Ports. New York Times: 1.]. In 1969, the Nixon administration tried just such a blockade on the U.S.-Mexican border. Twoo thousand customs and patrol agents were stationed along the 1,700-mile border with Mexico. The operation caused traffic delays of up to half a day, and 5.5 million travelers were searched, without one dramatic seizure of drugs. The response of the Mexican government was so strongly negative that the State Department finally had to warn the White House that its Operation Intercept was threatening relations with Latin America. The blockade was lifted and the name of the operation was promptly changed to Operation Cooperation [Freemantle, Brian. (1986). The Fix. New York: Tom Doherty Associates. page 148.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 38)