From: Christopher B Reeve <[cr 39] at [andrew.cmu.edu]> Organization: Sophomore, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, PA Costs of the WOD "The official figure for the drug war for fiscal year 1990 was $9.5 billion [Corn, David. (5/14/90). Justice's War on Drug Treatment. The Nation: 659 - 662.]. The federal budget for drug programs has quadrupled in five years. And the Pentagon budget for drug interdiction has doubled over the last year [Shenon, Philip. (4/22/90). The score on Drugs: It Depends on How You See the Figures. New York Times: 6E.]. In 1989, there was an estimated $986 million being spent on anti-marijuana enforcement alone [Wenner, Jann S. (6/22/90). Drug War: A New Vietnam. New York Times: 15.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 14) "The Bush administration proposed that for fiscal year 1991 the basic split of funds - 70 percent for enforcement and 30 percent for treatment - be maintained [Berke, Richard L. (1/25/90). Bush to Seek $1.2 Billion for a Bigger Drug War. New York Times: A12.] ... Bennett reaffirmed the administration's lack of faith in education as a means of doing anything about drugs in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee in February 1990. When Bennett was secretary of education under Reagan, he even sought a cut in drug education funds [Berke, Richard L. (2/3/90). Bennett Doubts Value of Drug Education. New York Times: 1.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 15) "The time, resources, and energy devoted to policing complaintless crimes, like drug use and trafficking, also deflects police time and resources away from other more serious crimes, crimes that are associated with just as much violence and that are arguably more destructive to the social fabric - white collar crimes, corporate crimes, environmental crimes, and political crimes [Reiman, Jeffrey. (1984). The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class and Criminal Justice. New York: Wiley; Hills, Stuart (Ed.). (1987). Corporate Violence: Injury and Death for Profit. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 16) "In 1988, the cost to the taxpayer for state and federal prisons alone was over $16 billion. For the whole enterprise - courts, corrections, jails, and police - the cost was $25 billion [Crittenden, Ann. (12/29/89). Prison Can Be a Dumb Solution. New York Times: 29A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 29 - 30) Poverty / Unemployment "The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice noted as long ago as 1967 that 'the application of these laws [against complaintless crimes] often tends to discriminate against the poor and subcultural groups in the population.' The report concluded that because of this differential enforcement, 'poverty itself becomes a crime' [President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. (1967). The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 18) "By criminalizing the use of certain drugs, the society labels as criminals a group of people who would not for any other reason be so labelled. In 1985, for example, 45 percent of the total arrests for drug law violations were for the possession of marijuana [Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1986. (1987). U.S. Department of Justice. Washington D.C.: GAO.]. In 1988, 391,600 people were arrested for marijuana offenses [Wenner, Jean S. (6/22/90). Drug War: A New Vietnam. New York Times: 15.]. More recently, the deputy chief of New York's Tactical Narcotics Team admitted that the vast majority of arrests in New York had been of small-scale dealers and users [Marriott, Michel. (2/20/89). After 3 Years, Crack Plague in New York Grows Worse. New York Times.]. Small-time dealers and users then become criminals and face discrimination in employment and housing that helps ensure that continued drug involvement will be an attractive, if not the only, alternative. The criminal label remains with the convicted person forever, no matter what his or her behavior. Longitudinal research on heroin users in London, however, has indicated the futility of labeling users as criminals early on in their lives, since drug use tends to decline on its own with increasing age [see Hamm, Mark S. (1988). Drug Policy and Applied Research: A Study of Users, Abusers and Politicians. Journal of Crime and Justice, 11(2): 103-121.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 25 - 26) "It should come as a surprise to no one that urban inner-city ghettos are filled with drug dealers. It is predictable that the segment of the population facing the most obstacles to attaining the rewards of the social system would opt for a fast and easy route to the affluence that all are taught to expect. The question for them becomes, Why be poor forever? The virtual abandonment, economically and socially, of already marginalized segments of the population has ensured that drug trafficking will be an attractive economic alternative, and that drug taking will provide one of the few cheap sources of recreation and escape from lack of opportunity, discrimination, and poverty." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 62) "It is interesting to note that the conservative approach to explaining the causes of criminal behavior has always been based on a rationalistic model. According to the conservative model, in deciding whether or not to commit illegal acts, individuals rationally weigh the benefits of crime and the potential costs (arrests, imprisonment, etc.). If the benefits of the crime outweigh the costs, the individual will most likely choose to commit the crime. The conservative response, however, has always been to inccrease the costs of the crime (e.g., administer harsher penalties), never to decrease the benefits (e.g., provide meaningful employment, job training and retraining, or an adequate social service net). In fact, government economic policy has done just the opposite. It has increased the relative benefits of crime - first, by having no employment policy, thereby ensuring that some segments of the population are condemned to lives of drudgery; and second, by criminalizing drugs and therefore driving up the profits to be gained by selling them." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 63) "The War on Drugs has helped to create a political environment in which this abondonment [of the lower class] can proceed not only without real opposition, but without need of even apologizing for it." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 64) "According to the Census Bureau, 36 percent of black families with a child under age eighteen are classified as living in poverty. This compares to 12 percent of white families [Byrd, Robert. (8/3/90). 24 Percent of Infants Born to Single Women. Montgomery Advertiser: 1.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 68) "What, then, is to be done with this segment of the population that is no longer needed? First, their abandonment must be legitimated to the wider society; second, any resistance to this abandonment must be diluted or stamped out. As has been argued in this section, the War on Drugs has facilitated both. There is scant sympathy for the marginalized since their problems and alienation are now largely perceived to be drug-related, and, therefore, self-induced. Illegal drugs and enforcement tactics against the marginalized have insured their virtual political neutralization." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 79) Corruption "In early 1990, a police officer in Montgomery, Alabama, Brad Sims, was convicted on charges that he sold crack cocaine to a police informant. Sims's defense attorney argued at his trial that Sims had been set up by other officers because he knew of their involvement in protecting drug dealers. Sims was convicted. In February 1989, however, four policemen were forced to resign from the Montgomery, Alabama, Narcotics and Intelligence Bureau after they failed to turn in money seized in a drug raid set up to test their honesty [McCartney, Tracey, and John Gerome. (2/15/90). Sting Ends in Officers' Resignations. Montgomery Advertiser: 1.]. Sims (who is black) was denied a new trial even though three of the four officers (who are white) were involved in the search of his home that turned up $360 in marked money that was the basis of his conviction [Foss, Shelton. (2/20/90). New Trial for Sims Ruled Out. Montgomery Advertiser: 3A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 21) "In 1988, three former DEA agents were charged with laundering more than $608,000 accumulated apparently while they were dealing in drugs. The narcotics trafficking and money laundering by the three men went on during and after their employment with the DEA [New York Times. (11/25/88). 3 Former Drug Agents Charged in Fraud Scheme: 21A.]. In December 1989, there were press reports of declining morale in the DEA due to pending trials of seven veteran DEA agents in four cases in Los Angeles, Miami, and Washington. The agents were accused of being deeply involved in illicit drug trafficking while they were employed to fight it. Agents in the Los Angeles case were charged with taking drugs from traffickers and stash houses and then travelling around the world arranging drug deals and hiding the proceeds [Berke, Richard. (12/17/89). Corruption in Drug Agency Called Crippler of Inquiries and Morale. New York Times: 1A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 22) "In 1988, four coastguardsmen were convicted of drug trafficking and passing confidential information to drug smugglers. In May 1990, indictments were pending against ten more coastguardsmen [USA Today. (5/23/90). Drug Probe: 3A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 22) "In August 1990, a fifteen-year veteran of the Internal Revenue Service was charged with passing on key information about an investigation into a drug-smuggling ring to one of the participants in the ring, and helping the members of the drug ring launder some of the illegal drug profits [Atlanta Journal Constitution. (8/11/90). Atlantan among 19 Indicted in Cocaine Ring: A5.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 22) "In Illinois over the three-year period 1987-1989, a total of sixty-six employees of the Department of Corrections were arrested on drug and other illegal contraband charges. In Chicago in the spring of 1989, three deputies were charged in federal indictments along with nineteen others with running a drug ring to supply inmates in the county jail. Two prison guards in Connecticut were arrested for drug smuggling in 1989. A federal-state task force in Michigan began investigating reports in 1989 that state corrections officials had allowed visitors to smuggle illicit drugs into the prisons and had protected inmates from searches in return for payments of up to $1,000 a week by dealers [Malcolm, Andrew H. (12/30/89). Explosive Drug Use in Prisons Is Creating a New Underworld. New York Times: 1.]. In June 1990, seven guards in a D.C. prison were charged with distributing marijuana, crack, or powdered cocaine to inmates. According to federal prosecutors, guards were recruiting inmates to make drug sales and arrange payments outside the prison [Montgomery Advertiser. (6/24/90). Prison Guards Charged: 5A.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 22 - 23) "Notables who have been convicted in money-laundering deals include former Representative Robert Hanrahan (R-Ill.), right-wing Republican Pat Swindall, and a leading fund-raiser for Jerry Brown's 1980 presidential race, Richard Silberman [Morley, Jefferson. (10/2/89). Contradictions of Cocaine Capitalism. The Nation: 341 - 347.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 23) "The administration has even considered drug involvement by friendly military and political leaders to be a useful for of political leverage. If these officials cease to be cooperative (as in the case of Noriega), threats of public exposure can be brought to bear. When cooperation is not forthcoming, the charge of narco-military control can always be trotted out. As Peter Bourne [Bourne, Peter. (3/25/88). U.S. Schizophrenia on Drug Runners. New York Times: 39.] has written, 'the cooperation of tainted leaders in the hemisphere on a host of political issues ultimately transcends our concern about drugs exported to this country.'" (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 151) Courts / Prisons "In 1988, drug cases represented 44 percent of criminal trials in federal courts. Soon, over half the criminal cases will be drug cases [Wermiel, Stephen. (2/6/90). Drug Cases Crowd Out Civil Federal-Court Trials as Judge Calls Business Litigation a 'Stepchild.' Wall Street Journal: A20.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 29) "It is estimated that drug offenders represent 20.5 percent of the parolee population [Whitt, Richard. (9/5/89). System at Work: More Dealers Being Imprisoned, More Being Freed. Atlanta Constitution: A9.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 30) "in some states that have adopted draconian penalties for drug offenses the overload of an already overburdened prison system has meant an increase in early release. In Florida, for example, prisoners served 52 percent of their sentences in 1986. In 1990, they served an average of 33 percent. Many of the new inmates were sent to prison for possession, a felony in Florida. Even Florida officials admitted that the result of increasingly harsh penalties for drugs was that at least some violent offenders were being released to make room for nonviolent drug users. In 1989, one out of every three 'early releases' in Florida committed additional crimes [Isikoff, Michael. (1/14 - /20/90). Florida's Crackdown on Crime Is Setting Criminals Free. Washington Post National Weekly Edition: 31.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 114) Precursors "Efforts to place restrictions on the chemicals used to process drugs are doomed to fail also because of the almost endless alternatives. Just as the flow of drugs changes direction in response to more stringent border interdiction, countries importing large quantities of precursor chemicals change. For example, when Colombia and some other Latin Americn countries imposed strict regulations on ether and acetone shipments in 1982, Mexico's imports of precursor chemicals increased 1,160 percent between 1983 and 1986 [Rohter, Larry. (5/13/90). Drug Fight Targets U.S. Chemicals. New York Times: 4A.]. Brazil and Ecuador are also becoming increasingly important sources for chemicals needed to refine cocaine [Moody, John. (7/23/90). The War That Will Not End. Time: 33.]. Even the drugs themselves can be synthesized, including drugs usually derived from plants. If coca leaves, for example, should ever be in short supply, cocaine could be made synthetically." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 39) "One chemist, who asked not to be named in an interview with the New York Times, remarked: You might decide to curb the sale of corn, which can be fermented to make moonshine. But the bootlegger would merely switch to barley or purnes or any of the thousands of natural substances containing carbohydrates. Curbing the precursors of many drugs involves similar problems [Browne, Malcolm W. (10/24/89). Problems Loom in Effort to Control Use of Chemicals for Illicit Drugs. New York Times: 17.]." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 39) Purposes of the WOD "Given the failure of the War on Drugs to accomplish its stated goals and the negative consequences of the criminalization-enforcement strategy, why has the administration chosen to pursue this course? The answer is this: While the War on Drugs has been ineffective and destrictive in some ways, it has been highly effective and highly successful in other, more important ways. First, the focus on the dangers of illegal drugs diverts attention away from the dangers of legal drugs, which are well integrated into the culture and the economy and are represented by powerful interests. The serious consequences of the legal drugs (like tobacco, alcohol, and the more dangerous prescription drugs) in terms of public health, violent behavior, spiritual deterioration, family disruption, death, and disease are downplayed in the quest for a so-called drug-free culture. The drug-free culture is in fact one in which citizens are free to consume their own culturally and economically integrated drugs and the drugs of other cultures are excluded. The population is encouraged to absorb the social costs of the use of legal dangerous drugs but not hte social costs of the use of illegal drugs whose profits are not under control. Second, the War on Drugs has been highly successful in diverting public attention away from fundamental social problems that plague the society. The Reagan and Bush administrations have managed to convince a substantial proportion of the American public that the dangers emanating from the use of cocaine, marijuana, crack, and heroin are among the greatest dangers threatening not only the health of the population but the very fabric of their existence as a society. Drug abuse is portrayed as a cause rather than a symptom of severe social problems, which are the predictable outgrowth of a social order that has failed, even with all its wealth, to provide a satisfying, enriching quality of life for its citizens. Third, by primarily focusing on drug use and trafficking by members of the lower class and minority groups, the War on Drugs has aided in legitimating hte virtual abandonment of minority and marginalized segments of the population and has assisted in making them appear as an enemy class deserving of marginality and impoverishment. Fourth, the War on Drugs has been used to legitimate a massive expansion of domestic state power and control." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 57 - 58) "the primary intent of the War on Drugs is not to stop drug trafficking or drug use. The War on Drugs is a tool in a larger war that is about increased authority and social control. William Bennett, the Drug Czar (or as some say, the Drug Bizarre), said himself that the issue was one of authority and control. The Wall Street Journal [Wall Street Journal. (12/29/89). The Devil You Know: A6.] echoed Bennett when it editorialized: 'This nation is suffering a drug epidemic today because of the loosening of societal control in general.' The real agenda, as the Drug Warriors have so plainly stated, is increased social control. The Wall Street Journal editorial continued by arguing that the remedy to the drug epidemic should include maintaining and increasing the stigma of drug use. Drug users, it was reasoned, should be stigmatized more, not less, so that they may be controlled more effectively." (Christina Jacqueline Johns, Power, Idealogy, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure, 174)