Newsgroups: talk.politics.drugs From: [c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com] (Chris Hugins) Subject: Programs of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in the Americas Date: Mon, 27 Jun 1994 16:08:51 GMT [ Article crossposted from soc.culture.latin-america ] [ Author was [s--st--e] at [u.washington.edu] ] [ Posted on 25 Jun 1994 06:07:09 GMT ] Copyright 1994 Federal Document Clearing House, Inc. Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony June 22, 1994, Wednesday SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY HEADLINE: TESTIMONY JUNE 22, 1994 THOMAS CONSTANTINE ADMINISTRATOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS/INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ANTI-DRUG STRATEGY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE Statement of Thomas A. Constantine Administrator The Drug Enforcement Administration United States Department of Justice for House Foreign Affairs Committee U.S. House of Representatives Concerning International Narcotic Control Programs June 22, 1994 Chairmen Torricelli and Lantos, Members of the Subcommittees: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the programs of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in this hemisphere. I appreciate this chance to speak about some of the important challenges we face in our international programs. I have been the Administrator of DEA for three months now, and in that short time I have recognized the need for us to put the international programs into a better perspective in relation to our overall domestic drug enforcement effort. I think we frequently lose sight of how our international programs go hand in hand with what we are doing within our borders, and today I'd like to talk about some important cases and DEA efforts which link the international and domestic aspects of our drug control mission. Violent crime has changed the face of America during the past decade. You cannot turn on the evening news without hearing reports of gun violence or vicious crimes against innocent children. Neighborhoods are no longer safe; even where I come from in upstate New York, many people will not leave their homes after dark, or walk down the street to buy a loaf of bread. The links between drugs and violent crime is sometimes overlooked, but it is real and still a central issue for us to deal with. Before 1985, violent crime was actually decreasing after a significant increase during the sixties and seventies. The appearance of crack cocaine in 1985 dramatically changed the landscape of crime and the criminal justice system in our country. This drug, as you know, spawned violence and addiction, tragedies we are living with every day. My assessment is that our current violent crime wave will remain with us for the foreseeable future. Demographics for the coming decades indicate that by the year 2005, the number of young people aged 15-19 will increase by 25 percent. Because young men aged 1824 are twice as likely to commit crimes as men over 25, we could continue to see significant rates of violent crime well into the next century. We must break the cycle of drug trafficking and drug abuse if we are to survive this crime wave. I think we can do that, but it will require us --- the American people and our government --- to establish sound policies and to stick with them for the long haul. This will require both domestic and international efforts which are built upon programs that work and have shown results. For many years, DEA has been at the forefront of this nation's efforts to dismantle international drug trafficking organizations. We will continue to aggressively pursue traffickers who operate around the globe. As Administrator, I intend to continue DEA's important global mission, keeping the following principles as guiding our actions in the coming years: First, that we must recognize that cocaine and heroin have foreign sources and the world's major trafficking organizations are headquartered in foreign countries. Other nations have international obligations to address the issues of drug production and trafficking. DEA will continue to work with the authorities in other nations to build institutions, share intelligence and make cases which have an impact on drug trafficking in the United States. Concurrently, we will enhance our domestic efforts, as well, balancing both foreign and domestic programs. That however, does not mean that we are lessening our pressure on the ma or traffickers in Colombia, Bolivia and Peru, but rather, that we will increase our attention on the surrogates that operate within our borders. Second, that resources for international programs must be dedicated intelligently and strategically, allowing DEA the flexibility to act quickly as new threats and opportunities arise. Third, that we have an obligation to the American people to enhance the quality of life in our communities across the nation. DEA has a major role to play in removing violent traffickers, who have a direct link to the degradation of life in our communities, from neighborhoods, and reducing the amount of drugs trafficked in our cities and towns. Fourth, that heroin is a major concern to us, and international and domestic programs must be developed to address this problem before it becomes any more serious. I intend to use these principles to formulate DEA's contribution to the international strategy, articulated in Presidential Decision Directive 14, which was signed by President Clinton last November. This Directive states that "the United States will treat as a serious national security threat the operations of international criminal syndicates" and will assist those nations demonstrating the political will necessary to fight narcotics trafficking. I'd like to take a few minutes to discuss with you some developments which have led to these assumptions. Major Traffickers and their Surrogates: Despite the fact that an increasing percentage of cocaine is being shipped to new European markets, the U.S. continues to be the main target for shipments from the Colombian cocaine cartels. The Cali cartel maintains a lock on much of the U.S. cocaine supply. This organization, headquartered in Colombia, depends on cocaine producers and transporters in Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, other Central American nations, and the United States. It also staffs distribution organizations in the major cities of the United States with Colombians who subcontract with street organizations in these cities. DEA has a two-tiered approach to reducing the cocaine supply in the U.S. : targeting the cartel leaders in Colombia and eliminating their surrogates' operations in the United States. It is critical to gather enough information on the major cartel leaders for indictments in the event that they will be brought to justice in the U.S. That, however, is less of a possibility today than it was prior to Colombian constitutional prohibition on the extradition of nationals. Nevertheless, DEA continues to put pressure on the cartels by interfering with their money supplies, transportation networks, chemical supplies and communications --- all the means that are critical to their operations. During the past year, DEA, working with other U.S. agencies and with counterparts in Andean and Central American nations, made significant inroads into the cocaine trade in this hemisphere. Some of these include: Medellin cartel leaders were either jailed or killed. Pablo Escobar and Juan Camilo ZAPATA-Vasquez were killed in shootouts with the Colombian National Police. Fabio OCHOA was sentenced to an eight year prison term. A major Peruvian trafficker, Demetrio CHAVEZ-Penaherrera (aka VATICANO) was arrested in Cali and expelled to Peru where he is now serving a thirty year prison sentence. Julio Fabio URDINOLA-Grajales, the brother of Ivan Urdinola, one of Colombia's major money launderers, surrendered to Colombian authorities in March. On September 2, 1993, Jaime Garcia-Garcia, whose organization provided major transportation services for a number of major Colombian traffickers, was arrested by Colombian authorities; he is presently incarcerated. Prior to his arrest, in June 1993, one of Garcia's former associates Joaquin Guzman-Loera, was arrested in Guatemala on the El Salvador border. Seizures included major loads in Guatemala (6.6 MT), Mexico (33.1 MD, OPBAT (2.2 MT) and Peru (8,900 kg). Several other former leaders of the Medellin cartel remain incarcerated. Of equal importance to DEA are accomplishments which have a direct effect on U.S. cocaine supplies and operations within our borders. Most cases have both international and domestic elements, and many could not have been undertaken successfully without the involvement of our overseas offices. A few examples: A New York-based Dominican Ramon Valasquez was transporting Colombian cocaine through Mexico into New York. An informant arranged to transport 1,000 kilograms of cocaine from Mexico thru Texas into New York. The cocaine was delivered back to Colombians in New York, where it was seized. Valasquez worked with Mexican transporters, Colombians in New York and Mexicans in Texas. A Colombian cocaine trafficker/money launderer who imported cocaine from Colombia to Mexico to New Jersey, used car dealerships in both Los Angeles and Phoenix, Arizona to facilitate distribution. In June 1992, 800 kilograms of cocaine transported in a R.V. was seized in Phoenix, Arizona, and 8 individuals were arrested. The Colombian trafficker is currently a fugitive. DEA/Tucson targeted a Mexican transportation group based in Agua Prieta Sonora, Mexico. This group transported Colombian cocaine and Mexican marijuana. A six-month wiretap investigation, which monitored 19 telephones and intercepted radio mobile telephone communications, resulted in the indictment of 108 defendants in the U.S. and Mexico, as well as the seizure of 4,000 pounds of marijuana, 200 kilograms of cocaine, and $3.5 million in assets. DEA/Houston targeted Colombians and Mexicans transporting Colombian cocaine into Houston. The organization utilized "trapped" vehicles, which were loaded with cocaine in Colombia and driven through Guatemala and Mexico and into Texas. The money was smuggled back to Colombia in the same fashion. The cocaine smuggled into Houston was further distributed in New York, Chicago and Louisiana. In November, 1993, as a result of a lookout placed by the Santiago, Chile Country Office, the Newark Field Division of DEA seized 606 kilograms of cocaine from containers shipped from Chile. Through wire intercepts, pen registers and surveillance, earlier this month (June 1-2), DEA seized 150 kilograms of cocaine, $600,000 and numerous documents connected to a cocaine trafficking organization related to Ivan Urdinola and other major traffickers in Miami, New York and Houston. 32 people were arrested, including a cell manager for the Houston area. Prior enforcement action taken in this investigation in Miami, Houston, and New York resulted in the arrest of over 18 suspects, and the seizure of 5 pounds of Colombian heroin, nearly 1,470 kilograms of cocaine, and over $15 million. DEA depends heavily on the use of court-ordered wiretaps to intercept conversations in pursuit of making cases against the cartel members. These Title 3's are costly and manpower intensive since most of the conversations are in Spanish and must be translated into English. Last year, Title 3's agency-wide cost over $14 million; this year's cost is projected to be about $17 million. A major Nigerian heroin trafficking organization was documented in August 1993 with the arrest of two Nigerians in Bangkok, Thailand. Extradition proceedings are pending against each of these individuals, who face heroin importation charges in New Jersey. This investigation also developed intelligence that led to indictments in the Northern District of California, District of Florida, and District of Minnesota for separate multi- kilogram importations of heroin into the United States. Additional intelligence and evidence to support prosecutions of American- based members of this organization in the Eastern and Northern District of New York was also developed. The investigation confirmed that this Nigerian trafficking organization operated in Southeast Asia, utilized New Jersey based West Africans, and imported multiple kilograms of heroin annually into the United States. The organization utilized international monetary transfers to facilitate this importation and to disburse the proceeds. In addition, the organization was also responsible for supplying secondary distribution organizations operating in the Northeast, Middle Atlantic and Midwest areas of the United States. The intemational-domestic links between major cocaine organizations and the street-level drug trade in the United States are well illustrated by a case I'm familiar with from my days as Superintendent of the New York State Police. The Herrera family, with direction from Cali, Colombia, operated a cell in New York City. The cell head was Helmer Herrera, brother of the cartel head. (The Herrera organization's annual profits were three times those of DEA's yearly budget.) All decisions carried out in the United States were made in Colombia --which phone numbers to use, which loads to move, what to pay workers. Detailed records on salaries, family history of workers and consignments of cocaine were kept. This was the cocaine which ended up in the suburbs of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, the cocaine which was ultimately distributed by violent street gangs. DEA, working with the New York State Police, dismantled this cell and seized records, computer disks and money. 100 arrests were made, 22 of which were principal defendants. After a disruption of several months, another cell resumed operations and there was no ultimate reduction in cocaine supplies in New York. What this case proves is the fact that both ends of the cocaine trade must be vigorously pursued. Players on both ends are replaceable, and the pressure must be kept up at the high, middle and low ends of the trade. While Pacho Herrera heads the arm of the cocaine organization doing part of the cocaine business in New York City, it is the violent street gangs who shoot children in the public housing complex in Washington Heights. It's critical to get them off the street too. We are at an important junction in our drug strategy. At a time when resources for law enforcement and foreign assistance programs are tight, we are having to balance the need to protect Americans from crime in our streets with our international obligations to our overseas partners in the drug fight. As the Administrator of DEA, I am reviewing both our domestic and international programs to determine how we can make better use of our resources. I expect that with the advice and input of DEA's senior management, we will be streamlining some of our international efforts in order to ensure that our programs contribute to the overall drug strategy which has both domestic and international components. The Need to Balance International and Domestic Programs: Building on the premise that we must balance our domestic enforcement programs and our international efforts, I would like to discuss some of the obstacles we must overcome to be successful in our international programs. The reality is that major traffickers have intimidated or subomed various police and government officials, enabling them to continue operating. There are limits on what the United States can expect foreign nations to do, given the fact that many of these nations do not control large areas where drug production and trafficking take place. We have more leverage in some places than in others; in a country like Burma, the source of most of the world's opium, we have almost none. We cannot influence Colombia's Constitutional Court, which recently held that possession and use of small amounts of certain drugs are constitutionally protected in Colombia, nor can we control government officials who advocate more liberal drug policies in Colombia. We can, and do, use the Presidential certification process to send strong signals to other nations to comply with their international obligations to reduce drug production and trafficking, and in some cases, the message is heard loud and clear. The President's decision not to certify Nigeria has certainly gotten that government's attention. International programs are an important component of our overall strategy which must be viewed through the prism of reality. We must not abandon or significantly scale back these programs. But, we cannot expect them to solve our drug problem or eliminate drug trafficking and abuse from our nation. DEA will absolutely continue to support institution building in other nations as we implement the President's directive. Working with the Colombian National Police, we have been able to help them enhance their law enforcement operations aimed against production and transportation networks in more remote regions of Colombia. We have also been able to increase the Bolivian Government's capabilities in managing, assessing and disseminating drug intelligence information. DEA has been instrumental in improving the ability of law enforcement organizations in Mexico, El Salvador and Argentina, to cite some examples. Regarding DEA programs, such as Snowcap, we will ensure that the role of DEA is to train and provide liaison with host-country enforcement organizations. As host countries gradually become more sophisticated and capable in their law enforcement programs, there will be less of a need for DEA to play a direct operational role. During 1993, 2,383 officers from 45 countries have been trained in basic and advanced drug enforcement by DEA. Of particular note is our work with officials from the Newly Independent States whose nations are now confronting a serious drug problem. Later this month, I will be traveling with FBI Director Freeh and (State) INM Assistant Secretary Robert Gelbard to Russia and several Eastern European countries to assess their needs as these countries address crime and drugs. I have asked DEA's top management to take a look at our international programs, including Operation Snowcap, and report back to me on whether these programs should continue as currently structured. I believe that our commitments to some of these programs should not be limitless, given budget and staffing realities. DEA will continue to participate as a full partner in our international programs, but we need to be more conscious of costs and results than we have in the past. Heroin: I am deeply concerned about the increased availability and dramatically increased purity in heroin in the United States. Worldwide production of opium rose from 2,580 metric tons in 1988 to 3,699 metric tons in 1993. Most of this production occurred in Afghanistan and Burma, where the central government does not control the growing areas. In addition, analysis of data from DEA's Domestic Monitor Program shows street- level purity continuing to rise. Heroin purity in the United States has increased from 3.6 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in 1992. With the increase in heroin availability and purity levels, we have also seen a continued rise in the number of heroin-related emergency room drug abuse episodes, especially in Seattle, Newark and San Francisco. Of special concern is the fact that traffickers in Colombia are cultivating opium and producing heroin. Despite the Colombian government's herbicidal eradication program, there are about 20,000 hectares of opium under cultivation. This makes Colombia the world's third largest source of opium poppy. From an enforcement standpoint, we are also concerned because Colombia has in place sophisticated trafficking networks which could readily diversify into heroin trafficking. During the coming months, DEA, as part of the Administration's review of heroin programs, will be developing heroin strategies to address the myriad heroin threats from Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, Nigerian traffickers and the Colombian organizations now producing and trafficking heroin. We must vigorously confront this threat by focusing the operational resources of all international intelligence and law enforcement agencies on attacking the infrastructure and leadership of these trafficking organizations. We must identify and attack the weaknesses in these organizations and disrupt their financial operations, as well as arrest, prosecute and imprison those responsible. This will take a concerted effort by the international community to address this renewed threat from an old enemy. Flexibility to meet new opportunities and threats: DEA must remain flexible and innovative in addressing the challenges posed by international drug traffickers. In order to respond fully to both the domestic and international aspects of the drug problem, we must have the necessary resources required to address this national threat. These international drug organizations are well- financed, with connections throughout the United States and abroad. Therefore, DEA must be in a position to move quickly to address emerging threats after having identified opportunities for meaningful actions. In closing, I again want to thank the Chairmen for this opportunity to discuss DEA's international programs with you today. I know that the coming months hold much challenge for me personally and for DEA as an agency. I will be happy to answer any questions you, or others on the Committee may have. -- -------------------------------------------------------------------- "No live organism can continue for long to exist sanely under conditions of absolute reality" -- Shirley Jackson The Haunting of Hill House Chris T. Hugins ([c--g--s] at [cup.hp.com]) OSSD/Cupertino Open System Lab, 47LA/P8 19447 Pruneridge Ave, Cupertino, CA 95014 Phone: 408-447-5702 Fax: 408-447-6268