Path: ordeal.cts.com!newshub.cts.com!atmnet.net!www.nntp.primenet.com!nntp.primenet.com!mr.net!newsfeeds.sol.net!news.maxwell.syr.edu!feed1.news.erols.com!howland.erols.net!math.ohio-state.edu!magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!cwrusc!courts From: [c--ur--s] at [usenet.ins.cwru.edu] Newsgroups: freenet.govt.hermes.opinions,courts.usa.federal.supreme Subject: 95-1268.ZD Dissenting Date: 19 Feb 1997 17:04:46 GMT Organization: Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio (USA) Lines: 210 Approved: [c--ur--s] at [usenet.ins.cwru.edu] Message-ID: <5efbre$[2--9] at [usenet.INS.CWRU.Edu]> NNTP-Posting-Host: cwrusc.ins.cwru.edu SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES -------- No. 95-1268 -------- MARYLAND, PETITIONER v. JERRY LEE WILSON on writ of certiorari to the court of special appeals of maryland [February 19, 1997] Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Kennedy joins, dissenting. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977), the Court answered the -narrow question- whether an -incremental intrusion- on the liberty of a person who had been lawfully seized was reasonable. Id., at 109. This case, in contrast, raises a separate and significant question concerning the power of the State to make an initial seizure of persons who are not even suspected of having violated the law. My concern is not with the ultimate disposition of this particular case, but rather with the literally millions of other cases that will be affected by the rule the Court announces. Though the question is not before us, I am satisfied that-under the rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968)-if a police officer conducting a traffic stop has an articulable suspicion of possible danger, the officer may order passengers to exit the vehicle as a defensive tactic without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, I assume that the facts recited in the majority's opinion provided a valid justification for this officer's order commanding the passengers to get out of this vehicle. But the Court's ruling goes much farther. It applies equally to traffic stops in which there is not even a scintilla of evidence of any potential risk to the police officer. In those cases, I firmly believe that the Fourth Amendment prohibits routine and arbitrary seizures of obviously innocent citizens. I The majority suggests that the personal liberty interest at stake here, which is admittedly -stronger- than that at issue in Mimms, is outweighed by the need to ensure officer safety. Ante, at 4, 6. The Court correctly observes that -traffic stops may be dangerous encounters.- Ante, at 4. The magnitude of the danger to police officers is reflected in the statistic that, in 1994 alone, -there were 5,762 officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops.- Ibid. There is, unquestionably, a strong public interest in minimizing the number of such assaults and fatalities. The Court's statistics, however, provide no support for the conclusion that its ruling will have any such effect. Those statistics do not tell us how many of the incidents involved passengers. Assuming that many of the assaults were committed by passengers, we do not know how many occurred after the passenger got out of the vehicle, how many took place while the passenger remained in the vehicle, or indeed, whether any of them could have been prevented by an order commanding the passengers to exit. There is no indication that the number of assaults was smaller in jurisdictions where officers may order passengers to exit the vehicle without any suspicion than in jurisdictions where they were then prohibited from doing so. Indeed, there is no indication that any of the assaults occurred when there was a complete absence of any articulable basis for concern about the officer's safety-the only condition under which I would hold that the Fourth Amendment prohib- its an order commanding passengers to exit a vehicle. In short, the statistics are as consistent with the hypothesis that ordering passengers to get out of a vehicle increases the danger of assault as with the hypothesis that it reduces that risk. Furthermore, any limited additional risk to police officers must be weighed against the unnecessary invasion that will be imposed on innocent citizens under the majority's rule in the tremendous number of routine stops that occur each day. We have long recognized that -[b]ecause of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic . . . the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office.- Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 441 (1973). Most traffic stops involve otherwise law-abiding citizens who have committed minor traffic offenses. A strong interest in arriving at a destination-to deliver a patient to a hospital, to witness a kick-off, or to get to work on time-will often explain a traffic violation without justifying it. In the aggregate, these stops amount to significant law enforcement activity. Indeed, the number of stops in which an officer is actually at risk is dwarfed by the far greater number of routine stops. If Maryland's share of the national total is about average, the State probably experiences about 100 officer assaults each year during traffic stops and pursuits. Making the unlikely assumption that passen- gers are responsible for one-fourth of the total assaults, it appears that the Court's new rule would provide a potential benefit to Maryland officers in only roughly 25 stops a year. These stops represent a minuscule portion of the total. In Maryland alone, there are something on the order of one million traffic stops each year. Assuming that there are passengers in about half of the cars stopped, the majority's rule is of some possible advantage to police in only about one out of every twenty thousand traffic stops in which there is a passenger in the car. And, any benefit is extremely marginal. In the overwhelming majority of cases posing a real threat, the officer would almost certainly have some ground to suspect danger that would justify ordering passengers out of the car. In contrast, the potential daily burden on thousands of innocent citizens is obvious. That burden may well be -minimal- in individual cases. Ante, at 6. But countless citizens who cherish individual liberty and are offended, embarrassed, and sometimes provoked by arbitrary official commands may well consider the burden to be significant. In all events, the aggregation of thousands upon thousands of petty indignities has an impact on freedom that I would characterize as substan- tial, and which in my view clearly outweighs the evanescent safety concerns pressed by the majority. II The Court concludes today that the balance of conven- ience and danger that supported its holding in Mimms applies to passengers of lawfully stopped cars as well as drivers. In Mimms itself, however, the Court empha- sized the fact that the intrusion into the driver's liberty at stake was -occasioned not by the initial stop of the vehicle, which was admittedly justified, but by the order to get out of the car.- 434 U. S., at 111. The conclu- sion that -this additional intrusion can only be described as de minimis- rested on the premise that the -police have already lawfully decided that the driver shall be briefly detained.- Ibid. In this case as well, the intrusion on the passengers' liberty occasioned by the initial stop of the vehicle is not challenged. That intrusion was a necessary by-product of the lawful detention of the driver. But the passen- gers had not yet been seized at the time the car was pulled over, any more than a traffic jam caused by construction or other state-imposed delay not directed at a particular individual constitutes a seizure of that person. The question is whether a passenger in a lawfully stopped car may be seized, by an order to get out of the vehicle, without any evidence whatsoever that he or she poses a threat to the officer or has committed an offense. To order passengers about during the course of a traffic stop, insisting that they exit and remain outside the car, can hardly be classified as a de minimis intrusion. The traffic violation sufficiently justifies subjecting the driver to detention and some police control for the time necessary to conclude the business of the stop. The restraint on the liberty of blameless passengers that the majority permits is, in contrast, entirely arbitrary. In my view, wholly innocent passengers in a taxi, bus, or private car have a constitutionally protected right to decide whether to remain comfortably seated within the vehicle rather than exposing themselves to the elements and the observation of curious bystanders. The Consti- tution should not be read to permit law enforcement officers to order innocent passengers about simply because they have the misfortune to be seated in a car whose driver has committed a minor traffic offense. Unfortunately, the effect of the Court's new rule on the law may turn out to be far more significant than its immediate impact on individual liberty. Throughout most of our history the Fourth Amendment embodied a general rule requiring that official searches and seizures be authorized by a warrant, issued -upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.- During the prohibition era, the exceptions for warrantless searches supported by probable cause started to replace the general rule. In 1968, in the landmark -stop and frisk- case Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Court placed its stamp of approval on seizures supported by specific and articulable facts that did not establish probable cause. The Court crafted Terry as a narrow exception to the general rule that -the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.- Id., at 20. The intended scope of the Court's major departure from prior practice was reflected in its statement that the -demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.- Id., at 21, n. 18; see also id., at 27. In the 1970's, the Court twice rejected attempts to justify suspicionless seizures that caused only -modest- intrusions on the liberty of passengers in automobiles. United States v. Brignoni- Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 879-880 (1975); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 662-663 (1979). Today, how- ever, the Court takes the unprecedented step of author- izing seizures that are unsupported by any individual- ized suspicion whatsoever. The Court's conclusion seems to rest on the assump- tion that the constitutional protection against -unreason- able- seizures requires nothing more than a hypotheti- cally rational basis for intrusions on individual liberty. How far this ground-breaking decision will take us, I do not venture to predict. I fear, however, that it may pose a more serious threat to individual liberty than the Court realizes. I respectfully dissent.