Newsgroups: alt.drugs,talk.politics.drugs
From: [S--Y--A] at [SUVM.SYR.EDU] (Sergio Rivera)
Subject: Re: War on drugs
Date: Tue, 28 Jun 1994 03:55:44 GMT

                           Copyright 1993 RAND
  The Implications of Colombian Drug Industry and Death Squad Political
                 Violence for US Counternarcotics Policy
                                  1993
 
SECTION: A RAND Note; N-3605-USDP; 3; Pages 21-43
HEADLINE: Interpreting political violence
BYLINE: By Kevin Jack Riley
DATELINE: Santa Monica, California
 
The Spectrum of Potencial Outcomes
 
   In the current environment of political violence in Colombia, there is
a range of possible outcomes. Few if these outcomes are pleasant. At one
end is the potential for authoritarian rule, or the formation of a police
state; at the other end, there is the possibility of a ''narcocracy'' or
narcotics-dominated government. The set of possible outcomes is outlined
below.
 
Authoritarian rule
 
   Frustrated by the continued inability of the government to quell the
violence, the armed forces or the police could take it upon themselves to
assume authority. Colombia has had extremely stable civil-military
relations throughout most of its history. Nevertheless, there are strains
in society that may threaten that stability, including continued failure
of the government to provide protection, increasing economic and social
pressures, increasing mobilization and urbanization, and fading memories
of Colombia's most recent bout of mass unrest, 'La Violencia.' Such an
event is likely to be triggered by a combination of factors, such as
assassination of a high-ranking official and widespread drug and death
squad violence, in conjunction with substantial agreement among key
government actors (executive, legislative, and military) that more
drastic steps are needed. Among the factors that have prevented this
scenario from developing to date is the tension between the executive and
the military that is grounded in frequent reports of military complicity
in human rights abuses and the contribution that the last experience with
authoritarian rule made to political violence. (30)
 
Narcocracy
 
   In this scenario, the drug lords obtain sufficient sway over
institutions to, in effect, run the government. An extreme form would be
actual high-level trafficker involvement in the government, such as
occured in Bolivia in the early 1980s. The critical element that appears
to be lacking, however, is the willingness by the drug lords to assume
responsibility for running the state; thus this form of administration is
unlikely. A milder form of narcocracy, under which high-ranking officials
are complicit in the drug trade, could evolve over time, although state
authorities appear remarkably impervious to this corruption. The mildest
form of narcocracy, where the lower levels of government are riddled with
corruption, or intimidated into ignoring the drug trade, already exists.
 
Institutionalized violence
 
   The state may well be bordering on this outcome. The difference
between the narcocracy and institutionalized violence is one of relative
emphasis. The former would be molded to assist the operation of the drug
economy, while the latter would emphasize the moral obligation of
cleansing Colombian society. Certainly political violence has been a
prominent feature of Colombian history, and there is little hope that it
will abate in the short run. There is hope, however, over the medium to
long run, of preventing the system from decaying even more and in
particular of preventing military and police abuses of human rights from
becoming institutionalized. Some steps that would assist in preventing
this outcome are outlined in the concluding sections. The transition
from the mild form of narcocracy to institutionalized violence will come
if the traffickers sustain their interest in a cleansing campaign, or if
the death squads accumulate the resources to operate independently of the
the drug industry.
 
   In addition, there remains a fouth possibility: a Colombia that sheds
its history of political violence by gaining control over, or reaching
compromise with, the drug industry and the death squads. Such an outcome
is not beyond the realm of possibility given the government's history of
negotiating with rebel groups, the success that M-19 has enjoyed since it
was integrated into the political system, and the government's past
willingness to negotiate with the traffickers.
 
Footnotes
 
(30) See Maulin (1973) and Osterling (1989) for more on this period in
     Colombian history.
 
Bibliography
 
Maudlin, Richard, 'Soldiers, Guerrillas and Politics in Colombia,'
                  Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1973.
 
Osterling, Jorge Pablo, 'Democracy in Colombia,' Transaction Publishers,
                        New Brunswick, Connecticut, 1989.